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INTRODUCTION

A deep shift appears to be underway in the nature of the nonunionized American workplace, as the rigid hierarchical bureaucracies of our fathers' IBM give way to the more vibrant and egalitarian
workplaces of our daughters' dot.com. 1 Going, if not gone in some
sectors, are the days when employees spent careers with the same
employers, moving up the corporate ladder as seniority and skill permitted, and with long-term employer-employee loyalties lasting
throughout the working years and on into retirement. 2 Instead,
many observers see the modern workplace as increasingly dynamic
and market-driven, with an emphasis on results both for employers
and employees, backed by a willingness of both to cut their losses and
3
move on if their interests are not met.
1. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (2003) [hereinafter ESTLUND]; Katherine Van Wezel

Stone, The New Psychological Contract:Implications for the Changing Workplace for
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) [hereinafter Stone, Psychological Contract]; PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKETDRIVEN WORKFORCE (1999); Peter F. Drucker, The New Society of Organizations,
HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 100 [hereinafter Drucker, The New Society of

Organizations].
2. See JOHN H.

LANGBEIN & BRUCE A.WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 51 (3d ed. 2000); HARRY C. KATZ & OWEN DARBISHIRE, CONVERGING DIVERGENCES: WORLDWIDE CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS (2000).

3. See Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 471-79. See generally
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (Kathleen
Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 3-60. For a
less sanguine account of the complications that the new workplace has created with
CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN

respect to wide fluctuations in employee income and the diminished security of work-

ers, see Peter G. Gosselin, If America is Richer, Why Are Its Families So Much Less
Secure?, L.A. Times, Oct. 10, 2004, at 1.
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Certainly, individual workplaces and industries vary greatly
with respect to such progressiveness. 4 Yet the larger trend seems
5
clear, and the best examples, such as UPS and the SAS Institute,
are the subject of frequent discussion and veneration. 6 Responding to
this development, Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone has urged
workplace law and dispute resolution scholars to consider the consequences of this change for the meaning, nature, and vindication of
workplace rights.7 In this article, I take up that gauntlet, at least in
part, by focusing on some of the implications of this paradigm shift
for the design of corporate dispute resolution programs for more progressive "new workplace" companies.
In my view, this shift may be seen as part of a larger democratization of the American workplace that is being fueled by many economic, cultural, and other factors.8 This seems to be a generally
salutary development, 9 and one that should include dispute resolution within its paradigmatic realignment. More specifically, in my
view employers should employ dispute resolution mechanisms that
4. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 56-59 (discussing low-wage workplaces as
examples of still-hierarchical and repressive environments, characterized by close supervision, high turnover, minimal training, fixed wages, and tenuous career ladders).
5. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
6. See EsTLuND, supra note 1, at 51; DON COHEN & LAURENCE PRUSAK, IN GOOD
COMPANY: How SOCIAL CAPITAL MAKES ORGANIZATIONS WORK 133-35 (2001) [hereinafter COHEN & PRUSAK]; BILL CATLETTE & RICHARD HADDEN, CONTENTED Cows GIVE
BETTER MILK 186-87 (1998).
7. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless
Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773 (2002); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Dispute
Resolution in the Boundaryless Workplace, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 467, 471-79
(2001). Stone also convened a symposium on the topic. See Symposium, Change at
Work: Implicationsfor LaborLaw, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2005).
8. Others have made this argument as well. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 1, at
60-84; Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary
Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49
(1998); Tara J. Radin & Patricia H. Werhane, The Public/PrivateDistinctionand The
PoliticalStatus of Employment," 34 AMERICAN Bus- L.J. 245, 259-60 (1996); CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY: A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
AND MANAGEMENT 17-27 (1994).
9. I am not suggesting that corporate America is moving toward the type of corporate democracy seen, for example, in Germany, where workers often participate in
the major governance decisions of the corporation through "Workers councils." See
Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise,24 J. CORP. L. 975, 980 (1999). In fact, some commentators suggest
Germany may be moving more toward the U.S. Model. See, e.g., Jens C. Dammann,
The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law Move
Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607 (2003). Rather, I am
suggesting that on the workplace side, companies are more willing to permit worker
teams to make decisions about their tasks, and in general are listening to their employees more than in the past.
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foster the fundamental values of democratic governance, as applicable in the new workplace, because those are the values that will ultimately support the structure and values of the new workplace.
Conversely, employers should avoid implementing dispute resolution
methods in a manner or form that subverts democratic values, because such measures have the capacity to undermine the structure
and values of the new workplace.
In this article, I demonstrate how principles of democracy may be
applied in the non-union corporate dispute resolution context. My focus is on the workplace rather than on matters of governance, but the
democratic character of dispute resolution at the governance level
clearly is a matter worth independent consideration. 10 In Part II, I
lay a foundation for the analysis by describing the structure and values of the new workplace, by demonstrating how the values that support the new workplace are consistent with democratic values in the
traditional governmental context, and by showing how the evolution
of the workplace may be seen as a democratization of the workplace.
I also argue that it is important to consider dispute resolution as a
necessary component of this realignment."l
In Part III, I demonstrate how these democratic values can be
promoted or frustrated by a dispute resolution systems designer's
choice of dispute resolution method or methods in non-union workplaces. After briefly establishing public adjudication as a presumptive baseline for the resolution of formalized workplace disputes, I
focus on the democratic character of the two primary methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution, arbitration and mediation. I conclude
that arbitration's democratic character is contingent: when it is voluntary and/or non-binding, the availability of arbitration to resolve
10. The research is nascent but promising. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L.
417, 452 (1996) (calling for use of ADR to resolve corporate governance disputes); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmakingin CorporateGovernance,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (applying principles of behavioral psychology to the corporate board context); G. Richard Shell, Arbitrationand Corporate Governance, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 517 (1989) (predicting greater use of arbitration to settle shareholder derivative suits); Thomas L. Riesenberg, Arbitration & Corporate Governance, 4 INSIGHTS,
Aug. 1990, at 2 (criticizing mandatory arbitration of securities disputes); John C. Coffee Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, The ContractualTheory of the Corporation,and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 921 (1988). Also, in 2004, the American
Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution received a grant from the Sloan Foundation to explore the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution in the settlement of corporate governance disputes.
11. This draws on earlier work on democracy and dispute resolution. See Richard
C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 L. &
CONT. PROBS. 279 (2004) [hereinafter Reuben, Democracy].
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workplace disputes enhances corporate democracy, as reflected in the
new workplace. However, when arbitration is mandatory and binding, the use of arbitration undermines the new workplace by diminishing the democratic values that structurally support it. As a
consensual process, mediation tends to be more democratic than arbitration, but it still must be implemented in a way that assures meaningful party autonomy and self-determination. Failing to implement
these dispute resolution methods in a way that enhances the democratic character of the new workplace carries potentially serious costs
in that they can erode the human and social capital that lies at the
heart of the new workplace, especially trust and organizational citizenship behavior, which in turn can have a negative impact on traditional measures of workplace success, such as diminished
performance, retention, and compliance with corporate decisions,
rules, and policies.
II.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

A. The Old and New Workplaces
The bureaucratic paradigm of what can be called the "old workplace" was the predominant model in the United States for much of
the twentieth century, 12 and included philosophies that ranged from
the "scientific management" of Frederick Winslow Taylor to the
"human relations" school of management encouraged by Elton Mayo.
Both sought to identify better ways of managing labor during the industrialization of the American economy in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. 13 Taylor's approach was predicated upon
close management of employee tasks and schedules, and heralded an
era of assembly lines and mass production, workplace compartmentalization, industrial specialization, and autocratic management. 14 On the other hand, Mayo's "human relations" approach was

See Stone, Psychological Contract,supra note 1, at 532; ROSABETH MOSS KAN(describing the bureaucratic
23-38 (1956).
13. See BRUNO RAMIREZ, WHEN WORKERS FIGHT: THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1898-1916 (1978).
14. Henry Ford's automobile manufacturing company is a common example. See
12.

TOR, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (2d ed. 1993)
model); WILLIAM H. WHYTE JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN

STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 1908-1921 37-38 (1981).
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to look at environmental and other conditions that would promote
greater worker productivity and loyalty.15
Both strains and their many variations could be felt within the
American workplace, and had the effect of shifting the technical
knowledge of production away from the exclusive domain of skilled
workers seen in the nineteenth century and relocating it within management. 16 As intended, this development also profoundly changed
the axis of power in the employment relationship, shifting it away
from labor and toward management.17
The result was a workplace generally characterized by fixed,
clearly defined jobs, bureaucratic structure, and hierarchical command.' 8 For workers, mobility was primarily a function of an internal labor market, 19 with clearly defined promotional opportunities
along career ladders established by the employer. 20 Salaries and
other benefits in this internal labor market were tied to one's position
on the ladder, and employers had a paternalistic role in guiding employees up the ladders they provided. Under this model, employees
often stayed with employers for a working lifetime, secured by a psychological contract between management and labor that essentially
assured job security in exchange for adequate performance and loyalty. 2 1 They were trained for specific jobs in the company, and stayed
15. The most famous of Mayo's experiments was the so-called Hawthorne Experiment, in which changes in location and lighting conditions boosted both worker production and morale. For a concise discussion, see LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT,
THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 210-12 (1991).
16.

See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, SHOP MANAGEMENT 98-99 (1911). For a

general discussion, see SAMUEL

HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGE-

1890-1920 (1964).
17. See Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 526-29.
18. See id. at 534. Indeed, the rise of unions was an effort to respond to this
changed dynamic by empowering workers through collective action.
19. The seminal work on internal labor markets is PETER B. DOERINGER &
MENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA,

MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1970); see

also Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and ComparativePerspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
153 (2003); Arnaldo Camuffo, The Changing Nature of Internal Labor Markets, 6 J.
MGT. & Gov. 281 (2002).
20. See ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 40-45 (describing bureaucratic workplace
structure in both the union and non-union contexts).

21.
G.

See Stone, Psychological Contract,supra note 1, at 537; see generally RONALD

EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC

POLICY 170-71 (6th ed. 1997). A "psychological contract" refers to an individual's belief regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between
that focal person and another party. A psychological contract emerges when one
party believes that a promise of future returns has been made, such as through pay
for performance, or a contribution has been given through some form of exchange, and
thus some form of future obligation has been created to provide future benefits. See

HeinOnline -- 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 16 2005

Spring 2005]

Democracy and Dispute Resolution

in those positions until they were allowed to climb to the next rung of
22
the corporate ladder.
The new workplace, roughly emergent in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, is a product of many different factors, including demographic changes in the workforce, technological changes, corporate
globalization, and general societal evolution. 23 Where the old workplace was static, bureaucratic, and hierarchical, the new workplace is
much more dynamic along most if not all critical dimensions, especially in more progressive new workplaces. Mobility and flexibility
are hallmarks of this new relationship. 24 Job security in the new
workplace is a function of employee success, skills, and broader employability, rather than a function of tenure and service to a single
company. Employee training and skill development in the new workplace tends not to be firm- or task-specific, but rather tends to be
more general so that employees can easily adapt to new and changing
environments. Work is also structured less hierarchically, often with
work teams empowered with their own leaders, practices, and standards. 25 Pay and benefits, too, are more linked to what the market
outside the firm may yield, rather than what may be provided by
26
climbing the corporate ladder.
Another defining structural component of this new workplace is
its contingent character, which reflects an important change in the
terms of the unwritten expectations, or "psychological contract," 27 between the old and new workplaces. 28 Recall that the old workplace
was characterized by an internal labor market, in which employers
Denise M. Rousseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations,2 EMPL.
REsP. & RTS. J. 121, 123 (1989).
22. See Stone, Psychological Contract,supra note 1, at 535-39.
23. Id. at 535-45 (analyzing statistical and other trends).
24. See Stone, Psychological Contract,supra note 1, at 568-72.
25. In this regard, work teams are a relatively common and popular form of management. See, e.g., THOMAS S. BATEMAN & SCOTT A. SNELL, MANAGEMENT: THE NEW
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 424-45 (6th ed. 2004)
26. See, e.g., JILL ANDRESKY FRASER, WHITE-COLLAR SWEATSHOP: THE DETERIORATION OF WORK AND ITS REWARDS IN CORPORATE AMERICA 32, 43 (2001) (examining
social Darwinism in the workplace); James A. Gross, The Common Law Employment
Contractand Collective Bargaining:Values and Views of Rights and Justice, 23 N.Z.
J. INDUS. REL. 63, 71 (1998).

27. See Rousseau, supra note 21, at 124-26.
28. Much has been written about the workplace being contingent in that many
workers may be temporary and outside or independent contractors, and may be performing functions that were once performed by traditional full-time employees. See,
e.g., Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 540-49; ESTLUND, supra note 1, at
45-46; Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1998); PETER F.
DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE 66-67 (1995) (describing change in
composition of temporary workers).
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were the primary gatekeepers of employee career progress, and compensated employee loyalty with job security and retirement benefits. 2 9 In the new workplace, however, there is no expectation of longterm employment, an issue about which both employers and employees are often quite candid. 30 Employees who are not productive or
who are otherwise problematic can expect to be let go. 3 1 Similarly,
employers who fail to provide employees with the income, environment, and other opportunities their employees expect can find it difficult to retain desirable employees. 32 Put another way, unlike the old
workplace, the door swings both ways in the new workplace; if the
relationship does not work out as hoped, or does not continue to make
sense under changing circumstances, both the employee and the employer have options. Employees can be free agents in that they have
an exit option in the new workplace that is fundamentally different
than they had in the old workplace. Rather than relying on corporate
ladders and paternalism, employees in the new workplace in many
respects are their own gatekeepers of "boundaryless" careers, 3 3 able
to constantly re-evaluate the employment relationship over time and
in light of other options, and to cultivate new skills and capacities to
make them more attractive in a dynamic external labor market. This
dynamic puts a different onus on companies to provide something in
the new workplace other than the mere job security assured by the
old workplace: an environment in which employees want to come,
stay, and excel. 34 It also puts a burden on employees to perform at
35
higher levels of achievement.
29. See ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 40-44.
30. See, e.g., The Future of Work: CareerEvolution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29-Feb. 4,
2000, at 89. See also DRUCKER, supra note 28, at 71; ROSABETH KANTER, ON THE
FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 190 (1997); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 23 (1998).
31. Consider this quote from Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric Co., in
an interview with the Harvard Business Review: "[Gliven today's environment, people's emotional energy must be focused outward on a competitive world, where no
business is a safe haven for employment unless it is winning in the marketplace."
Noel Tichy & Ram Charan, Speed, Simplicity, Self-Confidence: An Interview with
Jack Welch, HARV.Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 112, 120.
32. See GREGORY P. SMITH, HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW: TRANSFORMING YOUR
WORKFORCE FROM HIGH-TURNOVER TO HIGH-RETENTION

12-15 (2001).

33. See Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 553-56; Michael B. Arthur, The Boundaryless Career:A New Perspective for OrganizationalInquiry, 15 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295 (1994); Anne S. Miner & David F. Robinson, Organizational and PopulationLevel Learningas Engines for Career Transitions, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 345, 347 (1994).
34. See SMITH, supra note 32, at 12-15 (2001).
35. See Stone, Psychological Contract,supra note 1, at 479.
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In summary, the structure of the new workplace can be said to be
one of flexible job descriptions, skills sets, and command structures, a
mobile work force, and contingent expectations by both managers
and employees.
B.

The Values of the New Workplace

The primary operating values of the new workplace flow quite
logically from the nature of its fundamental structure, and are quite
different than those of the old workplace. For the old workplace,
workplace values primarily reflected the needs, interests, and concerns of the employer - including maintenance of a stable and productive work force, compliance with company policies and
procedures, and loyalty to the company and its goals. To be sure,
these values served both employers and employees. Job stability
meant job security for workers and a reliable work force for employers, for example. However, the shading of these values tilted in favor
of the employers, as the fundamental role of the employee was to
serve the larger interests of the company, as defined by the company,
36
and in a manner prescribed by the company.
1.

Employees as Partners,Not Servants

The new workplace operates from a set of values that differs significantly in at least two important and related respects. 3 7 First, the
new workplace is far more attuned to the interests of the employees.
To the extent that the old workplace could be described as a "masterservant" relationship, 38 the new workplace is structured more as a
39
partnership, with employers and employees as mutual stakeholders
sharing strengths and capacities for mutual gain. Of course, economic issues are still important, but the new workplace calls for
36. For a classic account, see WILLIAM H. WHITE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 363 (1956).
37. One may reasonably debate whether the values of the new workplace displace or complement the values of the old workplace, in whole or in part. While I
appreciate the academic flavor of the debate, I will leave the contention of merits to
others so that I can focus on the values themselves.
38. I am speaking at the conceptual level, rather than referring to the doctrine of
"master-servant" law. For more on that, see, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 80-85 (2d ed. 1999).

39. See, e.g., David Wheeler & Maria Sillanpaa, Including the Stakeholder: The
Business Case, 31 LONG RANGE PLANNING 201 (1998); Rienk Goodijk, Partnershipat
the Corporate Level: The Meaning of the Stakeholder Model, 3 J. CHANGE MGT. 225
(2003). Though the definition of stakeholder does include stockholders, for the purposes of this article we will focus primarily on employees and social influences rather
than shareholders when referring to stakeholders.
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greater recognition of the needs, interests, and concerns of the employees beyond mere economics. 40 In this regard, some management
experts emphasize flexibility in skill cultivation and career mobility,
employee participation in management decision-making, and selfregulated economic opportunity, such as bonus and other performance-based incentive systems. 4 1 Others emphasize recognition of
work as a source of dignity and self-actualization, as well as the importance of nurturing trust and communication. 4 2 But across theories, the equation of new workplace values plainly includes more
emphasis on the workers as individuals, recognizing their capacity
both to add value to the company when they are satisfied and to go
elsewhere should their needs, interests, and concerns be unfulfilled.
2.

The Value of Social Capital to the Company

A second material respect in which the values of the new workplace differ from the old is the importance of corporate culture and
social capital as a resource to be cultivated. It is related to the value
that the new workplace places on the worth of the employee, but it is
43
not the same.
The concept of social capital is drawn from the study of democratic governance and civil society, and embraces notions of public
44
trust, social connection, cooperation, reciprocity, and civic virtue.
Social capital researchers, led by Harvard political scientist Robert
40. See Orley Robel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2146-47 (2003) (reviewing PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING
IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET (2001)).

41. See, e.g., Michael Beer & Nitin Nohria, Cracking the Code of Change, HARv.
Bus. REV., May-June 2000, at 133; John P. Kotter & Leonard A. Schlesinger, Choosing Strategies for Change, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 106; EDWARD E.
LAWLER
TION 43

III,

THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE: CREATING THE HIGH-INVOLVEMENT ORGANIZA-

(1992).
42. Tristin K. Green, Discriminationin Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 107-8
(2003) [hereinafter Green, Disparate Treatment Theory].
43. For a further discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
44. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY 163-87 (1993) [hereinafter PUTNAM] (describing social capital and its
relationship to a democracy's institutional success). In political governance, civil society is generally recognized as the conceptual space between purely governmental and
purely private affairs, where much of our collective societal interaction takes place including churches, schools, places of employment, clubs, and other group affiliations.
Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 625 (1999); see also
LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 227, 228 (1999);
ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1992) (discussing the complexity of
the term).
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Putnam, 4 5 have come to recognize that this civil society and the social
capital it generates, spawned by and supporting the structure of democratic political governance, is just as important to the consolidation
of a healthy democracy as properly functioning political
46
institutions.
Putnam's seminal work on the effectiveness of democracy as separately implemented in the autonomous regions of Italy since the
1970s provides a helpful illustration. In brief, Putnam found that democracy in some regions was more effective than others, based on
institutional efficiency and responsiveness. 47 The effective democracies were marked by a civil society that broadly encouraged cooperation, reciprocation, and a sense of common good among citizens at all
levels of national life, from social to political to economic and beyond. 48 Such cooperation and reciprocation led to an ever-deepening
sense of social trust and order, both horizontally among citizenry and
vertically between the citizenry and its governmental and national
institutions. 49 In contrast, the less effective democracies were
marked by civic traditions of distrust, unhealthy competition, and a
sense of isolation and detachment between citizens and their governmental institutions. 50 The work of Putnam and other social capital
theorists strongly suggests that effective democracy requires more
than mere political institutions.5 1 It also requires the support of a
strong civil society, steeped in public trust of governmental institutions, a sense of social connection and cooperation among citizens and
between citizens and their national institutions, as well as a spirit of
good will, reciprocity, and civic virtue that reinforces this sense of
trust and connection.
Organizational behavior researchers have begun to apply these
principles in the organizational context as well, 5 2 helping to provide
45. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 44 (comparing effective and ineffective regional democratic governments in Italy since the devolution of most powers to regional governments in 1970).
46. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
47. PUTNAM, supra note 44, at 7-9.
48. Id. at 165-85.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., C. DAVID LISMAN, TOWARD A CIVIL SOCIETY: CIVIC LITERACY AND SERVICE LEARNING (1998) (analyzing the relationship between education, civic virtue, and

civil society); MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch
& Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2001) (same); THE VOLUNTARY CITY: CHOICE, COMMUNITY,
AND CIVIL SOCIETY (David Beito et al. eds., 2002) (exploring relationship between civil
society and economic health).
52. For a major collection of essays about corporate social capital, see CORPORATE
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND LIABILITY (Roger Th.A.J. Leenders & Shaul Gabbay eds., 1999).
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new insights on human and social capital assets that were hidden
and unappreciated in the old workplace, 5 3 but which the new workplace recognizes as among its most significant: its people, 54 the culture they create, and how that culture may be cultivated by
55
management.
Social connection, interaction, and reciprocity lies at the heart of
workplace social capital 5 6 and is reflected in trust between and
among employees and management, shared workplace values, norms
of cooperation and reciprocity, esprit de corps, and what some organizational behavior theorists call "organizational citizenship behavior"
("OCB"), 5 7 the rough equivalent of civic virtue in the political context.
OCB generally refers to the willingness of workers to serve the good
of the workplace beyond the expectations of formal job roles and systems of reward, such as making an extra effort to come into the office
during a snowstorm, being helpful to new employees, or meeting
deadlines when circumstances might provide an acceptable excuse.58
For early and still influential works, see P. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital,in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

241-58 (J.G. Rich-

ardson ed., 1986) and J.S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creationof Human Capital,
94 Am.J. OF SOC. 95 (1988); see also GREGORY G. DESS & JOSEPH C. PICKEN, BEYOND
PRODUCTIVITY: How LEADING COMPANIES ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE BY LEVER-

AGING THEIR HUMAN CAPITAL 8-18 (1999).

53. Henry Ford is said to have once lamented "Why is it that when I buy a pair of
hands, I always get a human being as well?" reported in COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note
6, at 6.
54.

It is important to distinguish human capital from social capital. Human capi-

tal refers to knowledge, skills, and capabilities. Social capital involves the relationships between individuals in a group context, including norms, values, and
obligations. See Michael A. Hitt & R. Duane Ireland, The Essence of StrategicLeadership, Managing Human and Social Capital, 9 J. OF LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL
STUD. 3, 4-5 (2002).
55. See, e.g., COHEN & PRUSAK supra note 6; ESTLUND, supra note 1; id. Corporate
social capital researchers will sometimes distinguish between structural, content, and

relational dimensions. See, e.g., J. Nahapiet & S. Ghoshal, Social Capital,Intellectual
Capital,and the OrganizationalAdvantage, 23 ACAD. OF MGT. REV. 242, 246 (1988).
The aspects of corporate social capital I have described here, and am primarily concerned with in this Article, involve relational social capital.
56. COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6, at 7.

57.

See

DENNIS W. ORGAN, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD

SOLDIER SYNDROME 4-5 (1988); but see Peter Cappelli & Nikolai Rogovsky, Employee

Involvement and OrganizationalCitizenship:Implicationsfor Labor Law Reform and
"LeanProduction" 51 INDUS. & LAB.REL. REV. 633 (1998) (reporting survey research
suggesting lack of a statistically significant total or overall relationship between employment practices and OCB).
58. See ORGAN, supra note 57, at 9-10; Daniel J. Koys, The Effects of Employee

Satisfaction, OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior, and Turnover on Organizational
Effectiveness: A Unit-Level, Longitudinal Study, 54 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 101, 103-4
(2001).
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Workplaces with high OCB may be seen as more desirable, and in
many respects may be more effective places of employment than
workplaces with low OCB.
While some researchers have identified nearly thirty different
forms of OCB, 5 9 early pioneer Dennis Organ specified five major organizational citizenship behaviors that are now widely recognized:
altruism (helping), compliance (with work rules and procedures),
courtesy (gestures taken to prevent problems), sportsmanship (willingness to accommodate minor and temporary inconveniences and
impositions without protest), and civic virtue (constructive engagement in the civic life of the company). 60 These behaviors have been
found to enhance the quality of the workplace, and contribute to job
satisfaction, organizational commitment, fairness, trait conscientiousness, and leader support. 6 1 More particularly, corporate social
capital theorists Don Cohen and Laurence Prusak suggest the cultivation of corporate social capital can lead to:
" Better knowledge sharing due to established trust relationships, common frames of reference, and shared goals;
" Lower transaction costs due to a high level of trust and cooperative spirit (both within the organization and between the organization and its customers and partners);
* Lower turnover rates, reducing severance costs and hiring and
training expenses, avoiding discontinuities associated with
frequent personnel changes, and maintaining valuable organizational knowledge;
• Greater coherence of action due to organizational stability and
62
shared understanding.
Professor Cynthia Estlund further argues that this social capital
also provides a basis for loyalty in the new workplace, replacing the
old workplace's promise of long-term employment as the glue that
keeps the company together. Mere economics, Estlund argues, is not
59. See Philip M. Podsakoff et al., Organizational Citizenship Behaviors: A
CriticialReview of the Theoretical and EmpiricalLiterature and Suggestions for Future Research, 26 J. OF MGMT. 513, 516 (2000).
60. See C. Ann Smith et al., OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior:Its Nature and
Antecedents, 68 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 653, 654-66 (1983); see generally ORGAN,
supra note 57.
61. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lepine et al., The Nature and Dimensionality of Organizational Citizenship Behavior: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 87 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 52 (2002) (reporting positive correlation between Organ dimensions and
these aspects of the workplace).
62. See COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6, at 10.
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enough to "foster either the employee loyalty or the stable and productive relations among co-workers that are necessary for successful
competition." 63 Rather, when workers enjoy where they are working,
they will be more likely to stay even in the face of potentially greater
economic incentives. This is loyalty that is earned, not paid for.
Cohen and Prusak offer SAS Institute, the world's largest privately held software company, as an example. 64 SAS provides data
warehouse and decision-support software for a wide range of industries, including seat-and-route data for major airlines, clinical trial
data for pharmaceutical companies, and even the Consumer Price Index. Remarkably, SAS's turnover rate is less than 4 percent. 65 Salaries are described as "good but not extravagant," not enough to
attract workplace free agents. 6 6 Rather, loyalty is fostered in other
ways. A particularly important vehicle, for example, is the emphasis
SAS places on research and development ("R & D"), a shared value
among those committed to software. SAS invests around 30 percent
of its annual budget into R & D, giving its software engineers the
mandate and resources to continually improve their products. 6 7 SAS
also listens to its employees; it estimates that it accepts 85 percent of
all employee suggestions for improving software code, which both enhances its products and shows respect for employees. 68 It also shows
63. ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 50. This argument is part of a larger argument
about the unique capacity of the workplace to strengthen American diversity, particularly racial and gender diversity, by fostering greater understanding, connection, cooperation, and trust.
64. COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6, at 133-35.
65. In a New York Times Magazine article on loyalty in the virtual age, Stanford
University Business Professor Jeffrey Pfeffer was quoted as saying "the company says
that people will have three or four careers during their working lives and it hopes all
will be at SAS." Adrian Wooldridge, Come Back, Company Man!, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 5, 2000, at 82. Other examples of social capital intensive companies include
UPS, the pharmaceutical company Aventis, 3M, Hewlett-Packard, and executive recruiter Russell Reynolds Associates. See COHEN & PRUSAX, supra note 6, at 4.
66. COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6, at 134. To be sure, not all new workplaces
include the cultivation of social capital as a prominent value. See, e.g., ALAN HYDE,
WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LA-

MARKET 3-23 (2003) (key elements of high-velocity labor market include startups, turnover, flexible compensation, outsourcing, and global production networks,
often with little or no emphasis on social capital). For a criticism decrying the corrosive effect of a modem capitalism, see RICHARD SENNETr, THE CORROSION OF CHARACBOR

TER:

THE

PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES

OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM

24 (1998)

("corrodes trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment"). For a response, see Sanford M.
Jacoby, Smelting into Air? Downsizing, Job Stability and the Futureof Work, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1195 (2000) (contending that Sennett overstates the case).
67. COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6, at 134.
68. Id. at 135.
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its care for employees in other ways, such as providing generous benefits, including a thirty-five-hour work week, on-site day care, recrea69
tional facilities, and a full-indemnity health insurance plan.
C.

The Need to Consider Dispute Resolution as Part of the New
Workplace

Despite the potential for employee enrichment and social capital
to energize the new workplace, there will still be conflict. Disputes
are an inevitable fact of organizational life. However, they do have
the potential to be constructive or destructive depending upon how
they are handled.7 0 Constructive conflict permits organizations to
learn and grow from conflict. 7 ' Conversely, destructive conflict tears
at the fabric of the workplace by fostering dissention, distrust, and
unhealthy internal competition.7 2 Thus, in the new workplace, effective constructive dispute resolution is a particularly vital considera73
tion for any organization.
Before the rise of the American dispute resolution movement, informal negotiation between workers and managers was the most
common form of dispute resolution in the non-union workplace, sometimes followed by litigation if attempts at negotiated settlement
failed. 7 4 However, the workplace has been an important hub of dispute resolution activity, as corporate acceptance of dispute resolution
has increased dramatically during the rise of modem ADR. 75 This is
69.

Wooldridge, supra note 65, at 82.

70.

See DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALE-

MATE, AND SETTLEMENT 9-13 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter PRuiTT]; see generally MORTON
DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES
(1973); LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956).

71.

See generally CHRIS ARGYRIS, ON ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING (2d ed. 1999);

PETER SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF LEARNING ORGANIZA-

(1994).
72. See Frances E. Zollers & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Workplace Violence and
Security: Are There Lessons for Peacemaking?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 479
(2003) (discussing "toxic" workplaces and their capacity to incite violence).
73. See, e.g., CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
TIONS

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY

ORGANIZATIONS 5-6 (1996); KARL A. SLAIKEu & RALPH H. HASSON, CONTROLLING THE
COSTS OF CONFLICT: How TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 5-16 (1998).
74. Arbitration has long been a part of collective bargaining agreements. See
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 3-7 (Alan Miles

Rubin gen. ed., 6th ed. 2003).
75. DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES - A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS
(1998) (surveying ADR use among 1,000 of largest U.S. corporations) (hereinafter LIPSKY & SEEBER).
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particularly true of mediation, and to a lesser extent, arbitration. 76
Moreover, businesses often use "step" or "tiered" approaches that involve several different forms and stages of dispute resolution, often
77
ending in binding arbitration.
The capacity of such mechanisms to control the business costs of
conflict is an important factor in employers' embrace of alternative
dispute resolution. 78 Other factors include the ability to exert
greater control over the process and outcome of dispute resolution
and the ability to comply with legal mandates imposed or encouraged
by federal and state governments.7 9 Of these incentives, cost savings
appear to be particularly salient for businesses, and may be achieved
in a variety of ways.8 0 For example, savings can be achieved through
the prevention of unnecessary formalization of disputes,8 1 as well as
the appropriate early resolution of formalized conflicts, before litigation costs begin to mount.8 2 While proponents of corporate dispute
resolution rightly tout these benefits,8 3 others have been less
sanguine, suggesting quite bluntly that business's embrace of ADR

76. See id.
77. See e.g., Kathleen M. Scanlon & Harpreet K. Mann, Inside Guide to MultiStep Dispute Resolution Clauses, ADR, 12 Counsel In-Box, Mar. 2003, cited in RISKIN
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAwYERS (3d ed. forthcoming 2005) (chapter 7 manuscript at 85-90, copy on file with author). See also DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., CARVE-OUTS
IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 26-35 (2002).

78. See generally SLAiKEu & HASSON, supra note 73, at 16-19; LIPSKY & SEEBER,
supra note 75.
79. See LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 75 (reporting that 81 percent of respondents
say mediation provides a more "satisfactory process" than litigation, 67 percent saying it provides more "satisfactory settlements," and 59 percent saying it "preserves
good relationships"). It is worth noting approximately 4,000 businesses have signed
the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation (the corporate
"Pledge"), under which they commit to explore the use of ADR in disputes with other
signers. For specific signatories, see CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, at http:l!
www.cpradr.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
80. See LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 75, at 5 (reporting that 89 percent of respondents viewed mediation as a cost-saving measure, and 55 percent reporting that cost
pressures affected their decision to use ADR).
81. For a study documenting such savings in the context of privatized workers'
compensation, see DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., CARVE-OUTS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION

119-27 (2002).
82. Brown & Root has estimated its workplace dispute resolution program has
saved at least 40 percent of what it would ordinarily spend in legal fees. See John W.
Zinsser, Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows but Some Questions Persist, 12 NEGOT. J. 149 (1996).
83. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management,
2001 WIs. L. REV. 831 (2001).
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relates primarily to its interest in avoiding civil juries and the possi8 4
bility of hefty punitive damage awards.
Regardless of the motivation, the capacity of dispute resolution
to contribute to workplace culture - by managing conflict effectively,
by preventing its unnecessary escalation, and by channeling its tensions into a constructive direction as an agent of appropriate change
- is a benefit that has been largely overlooked.8 5 This capacity is
greatest, in my view, when the values of dispute resolution coincide
with the larger values of the new workplace itself. In the next part,
Part III, I suggest that the values of the new workplace reflect deeply
rooted principles of democracy, and in Part IV, I turn to how companies may use this knowledge to design dispute resolution systems
that enhance, rather than diminish that democratic character.
III.

THE NEW WORKPLACE AS AN EXPANSION
OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY

The concept of a "corporate democracy" that analogizes corporate
and governmental entities is not new.8 6 Both corporate and governmental entities are forms of organizational structure in which authority to govern is in part predicated on what is in effect a social (or,
in the business context, psychological) contract8 7 that includes voter
consent as a measure of approval and accountability.8 8 The analogy
is imperfect, but it is close enough to suggest that the experiences of
one domain may provide some helpful insights into the nature, function, and operation of the other. In my view, dispute resolution is one
such area in which the sharing of experience is appropriate and
instructive.
84. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?: Debunking The Supreme Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 683 (1996).
85. See LEVINE ET AL., supra note 81, at 5-6 (observing how most workers' compensation carve-out disputes were settled at early stages of tiered process, thus
preventing more formal mediation and arbitration proceedings); D. Leah Meltzer, The
Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 549, 596-603 (1998) [hereinafter Meltzer] (discussing benefits of ombuds offices, including identification of
needs for systemic changes).
86. See Meltzer, supra note 85, at 549, 596-603; see also JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 3, 521-30 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter CHOPER
ET AL.].

87. On the corporate side, see CHOPER ET AL., supra note 86, at 32-34; on the
governmental side, see generally Richard Vernon, Contractarianism,in POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, AND CONCEPTS 54-57 (Seymour Martin Lipset ed.,
2001).
88. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 86, at 521. The effectiveness of shareholder approval as a check on corporate action has long been the subject of debate. For a discussion, see CHOPER ET AL., supra note 86.
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Traditional Corporate Democracy

Traditionally, the notion of corporate democracy has been considered primarily in the context of corporate governance, and one way to
think about the workplace transformation from old to new is as an
extension of the concept into the workplace, as well as an expansion
of its scope.8 9
The underlying theory of corporate democracy in the traditional
context of governance is that people are the best judges of their interests,9 0 and that increased shareholder participation in the decisions
of the corporation will lead to the benefits of accountability in terms
of constraining management discretion and curbing abuse; to better,
more legitimate corporate decisions and policies; to greater corporate
efficiency and effectiveness in achieving corporate goals; and perhaps
even to heightened corporate citizenship and social responsibility. 9 1
Corporate democracy has a certain populist appeal because of its
resonance with deeply held American political and cultural values,
and is experiencing something of a resurgence as the Enron,
WorldCom, and other corporate scandals of the early twenty-first
century have given rise to calls for greater corporate accountability
and responsibility. 9 2 In 2003, for example, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC")93 unveiled a major corporate democ-

racy initiative, which included proposals to give shareholders greater
say in nominating directors' proxy solicitations, corporate control contests, and compliance with disclosure requirements, as well as more

89. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 19, and sources cited therein; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Sheldon Bernstein & Henry G. Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 226
(1940). For an argument that corporate democracy is purely a myth, at least with
respect to the inclusion of racial and minority voices, see Thomas W. Joo, A Trip
Through the "Maze of Corporate Democracy" Shareholder Voice and Management
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735 (2003).
90. Olga N. Sirodoeva-Paxson, JudicialRemoval of Directors:Denialof Directors'
License to Steal or Shareholders' Freedom to Vote?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 110 (1998).
91. See, e.g., John A. Byrne et al., How to fix corporategovernance, Bus. WK., May
6, 2002, at 68.
92. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, Mar. 31, 2003.
93. It is significant to note that this initiative has been promoted by a Republican
Party administration, which as a categorical matter is often thought of as more probusiness than the rival Democratic Party.
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authority to make general shareholder proposals on matters of corpo94
rate governance.
The features of the SEC model are familiar elements of corporate
democracy in governance, 95 and roughly parallel the majoritarian
conception of democracy in the governmental context. The emphasis
is on political rights of voting and participation by shareholders, as
well as, to a lesser degree, greater communications among sharehold97
96
ers as fostering democratic interest representation and dialogue.
In my view, however, political participation is only one of several values that serve and define democratic governance, regardless of
whether that governance is public or private.
B. Broadening the Frame: The Essential Values of Democracy
The emphasis on participation values in corporate democracy
correlates with the relatively narrow vision that public law has given
to democracy in the United States for much of the last century.
American constitutional scholarship has defined democracy in largely
procedural terms, as a system of governance in which "the majority
rules."9 8 As a result, the conventional wisdom in law has held that
94. See SEC Press Release, Commission to Review Current Proxy Rules and Regulations to Improve Corporate Democracy (Apr. 14, 2003); Gregory T. Davidson, Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies, 1385 PLI/CoRP. 723, 761 (2003). For a discussion
of some of the agency's follow-up actions, see R. Daniel Witschey Jr., The SEC Proposes Proxy Rules: One Would Require a Company to Include Shareholders'Nominees
for Directorin its Proxy Materials, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 19.
95. James McRitchie, Universal Elements and Democratic Governance, Speech
Presented to the International Company Secretaries Conference, available at http://
www.corpgov.net/forums/commentary/universal.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
96. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87-88, and 101-04 (1980)
(articulating "representation-reinforcing" theory of American democracy). See JESSE
H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL. REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-6 (1980) (review appropriate
when necessary to vindicate certain individual rights).
97. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CI. L. REV.
765 (1997) (exploring the notion of "public reason" as a substantive mitigating force in
the conflict of doctrines in a pluralistic democracy); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (promotion of public dialogue as a substantive value of individual freedom arises from the democratic
foundations of the Constitution); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (outlining the origins and modern applications of the republican belief in deliberative democracy); see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163 (1988) (arguing that republicanism
embraces meaningful citizen dialogue on social and political issues).
98. This focus has been in part a consequence of deep concerns over the so-called
"counter-majoritarian difficulty," the possibility of unelected judges negating the will
of a majority of elected legislative representatives and, worse yet, imposing their own
substantive values on the majority. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
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democracy should be about process rather than substance, and that
the role of the courts is to assure the availability and effectiveness of
majoritarian processes. 99
More recently, however, many legal scholars have been urging a
broader definition of democracy, one that recognizes that there are, in
addition to the procedural values of democracy, certain substantive
values as well.10 0 In a recent law review article, I joined these scholars and identified three sets of substantive values that may be used
to assess the democratic character of a dispute resolution method,
process, or system: political, legal, and social capital values. 1 1 In
brief, the political, or majoritarian, values are participation, accountability, transparency, and rationality. The legal values are equality
and due process. The social capital values are public trust, social connection and cooperation, reciprocity, and civic virtue.
Crucially, all of these values are aimed at the more fundamental
substantive value of promoting personal autonomy and the capacity
for self-actualization.10 2 This is a primary lesson10 3 from the birth of
modern Western democracy in the Age of Enlightenment's repudiation of a divinely ordained socio-political hierarchy,' 0 4 its embrace of
16, 18 (2d ed. 1986) (judicial review a "deviant institution in the American
democracy"). Other disciplines, such as political science, define democracy more
broadly, as a system of government with many different component parts. See, e.g.,
Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is... and Is Not, in THE
GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 47-49 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds.,
1993).
99. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 280 n.11.
100. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 1820 (2001) (criticizing failure to distinguish majoritarianism and democracy); CASS R.
SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 163 (1993) (arguing for greater attention paid
to "social outcomes" not based on "existing preferences" derived from voting); Erwin
Chemerinsky, 1988 Term: Foreword, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV.
43, 64-72 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme Court for its adherence to a majoritarian
paradigm); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1-7 (2002) (generally arguing against "grand theories" of constitutional interpretation).
101. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 287-93. While this tripartite clustering is somewhat arbitrary and contrived, it does help to contextualize and concretize the political elements that are dominant under common majoritarian
understandings of democracy.
102. For further discussion, see id. at 258-87 and accompanying text.
103. This new understanding touched virtually all aspects of social, economic, and
political life - from science, letters, and the arts to religion, philosophy, and political
organization. For a general discussion in a classic treatment, see THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 1-30 (Lester G. Crocker ed., 1969) [hereinafter CROCKER].
104. It should be noted that the roots of Enlightenment-era democracy actually
extend back to ancient Greece and Rome. For a discussion, see ROBERT GOLDBERG,
Ancient Theory, in SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, AND CONCEPTS 178-88 (2001).
BRANCH
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individual worth and self-actualization through reason, education,
industry, and opportunity, 10 5 and its deliberate expression in the
grand experiment of American democracy. 10 6 In the rest of this subsection, I will briefly describe each of these sets of democratic values,
as well as their application in the workplace context.
1.

Political Values

The first, and largest, set of core democratic values may be understood as those primarily intended to foster collective, majoritarian
self-governance by enhancing the capacity of individuals to participate in that governance effectively. These include: participation, accountability, transparency, and rationality.
a) Participation
The consent of the governed is an essential concept for democracy, and is implemented through the democratic value of participation. 10 7 This is the root of the traditional majoritarian
understanding of democracy. Under this social contract theory, the
exercise of coercive government power is seen as legitimate because
laws are enacted with the consent of those who will be bound by
them. In the workplace context, the notion of "the governed" has
been translated to refer to shareholders, and, in my view, may also
refer to those who work for the company in the workplace context.10 8
b) Accountability and Transparency
In political governance, accountability generally refers to the degree to which government may be held responsible to the citizenry for
its policies, words, and actions. A closely related value is transparency, which generally refers to the openness of government decision-making. In the workplace, accountability has a slightly different
meaning than that of holding decision-makers accountable. Rather,
accountability can be understood as the workplace's responsiveness
105. See

CROCKER,

supra note 103, at 3 ("[Tihe rejection of Christianity and the

substitution of a secular philosophy were at the core of the new outlook.").
106. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AEmcAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
3-10 (1969) (observing that the American revolution was unique among revolutions
because "Americans were not an oppressed people; they had no crushing imperial
shackles to throw off."); see also CROCKER, supra note 103, at 3; TUSHNET, supra note
97, at 91-118.
107. See Vernon, supra note 87, at 54-57.
108. See Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: JuniorPartnerin Success and
Senior Partnerin Failure,37 U.S.F. L. REv. 587 (2003) (describing different models of
worker participation in the United States and in other countries).
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to effective and ineffective worker performance. To the extent an employee underperforms, principles of accountability in the new workplace would suggest that the employee improve or be terminated;
indeed, the failure of management to enforce this principle can have
a demoralizing influence on the workplace.' 0 9 To the extent that the
employee meets or exceeds performance standards, principles of accountability would suggest appropriate rewards for the employee,
which not only benefits the employee, but also provides visible incentives to other employees that are important to the new workplace.
c)

Rationality

Rationality in the democratic sense refers to the consistency of
decisions with law, social norms, or public expectations." 0 In government, rationality acts as a protection against arbitrary and capricious decision-making.I' In the workplace, rationality may be seen
as relating to the sensibility of management and corporate decision
and actions in and about the workplace, as well as other corporate
goals and objectives. The more sensible such decisions are, the more
legitimacy and acceptance they will command.
2.

Legal Values

The foregoing political values are complemented by at least two
values that pertain to the application of substantive rules: equality
and due process."1 2 Equality, or neutrality"13 speaks to the notion of
the same rules being applied in the same manner to all persons who
are similarly situated. The principle of equality in a democracy
109. See, e.g., Jill Kickul & Scott W. Lester, Broken Promises:Equity Sensitivity as
a ModeratorBetween Psychological ContractBreach and Employee Attitudes and Behavior, 16 J. Bus. & PSYCH. 191, 202-13 (2001) (entitled individuals found to have
greater increases in negative affect toward their organization and greater decreases

in job satisfaction and organizational citizenship behavior than benevolent individuals following a breach of extrinsic outcomes, such as pay and benefits).
110. See Jerry L. Mashaw, AdministrativeDue Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B. U. L. REV. 885, 901-02 (1981).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004) (prohibiting arbitrary and capricious actions by

federal administrative agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act). See also
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring a "rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made" in order for administrative action to survive arbitrary and capricious
review) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168

(1962)).
112. Legal values would also include those human rights values typically embraced by liberal democracy. I emphasize equality and due process because they are

most salient to the issues addressed in this paper.
113.

See CASS R.

SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL

CONSTITUTION 17-39 (1993).
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serves as a check on arbitrary and capricious decision-making, which
in turn helps to assure the stability of the political, social, and economic orders. Due process is closely aligned with equality in its operation as a constraint upon arbitrary government action, and is
essentially the promise of fair treatment at the hands of the government. The path of due process in American public law suggests due
process may be understood in at least two dimensions: procedural
due process (focusing on the right to notice and a hearing before
rights are taken away by the government) and substantive due process (focusing on the substantive fairness of rules). 1 14 In the business
context, due process is particularly significant with respect to the legitimacy of workplace rules, 115 including the promulgation of workplace rules and policies that are seen as substantively fair, applied
even evenhandedly, and administered fairly.
3.

Social Capital Values

The final category of core democratic values relates to social capital, in particular the promotion of civil society."1 6 As discussed
above, 17 in the corporate context this social capital may manifest
itself as the informal culture within the workplace that helps shape
attitudes and behavior, including connection, reciprocity, trust, and
organizational citizenship behavior." 8 This is the workplace
equivalent of civic virtue." 9
114. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 41516 (13th ed. 1997).
115. See PUTNAM, supra note 44, at 163-87; Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the
Law: A PoliticalPerspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 856-58 (1998) [hereinafter Tyler,
Public Mistrust].
116.

See PUTNAM, supra note 44, at 163-85.

117. See supra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
118. For a good concise discussion of corporate culture and its effects, see John W.
Teague, Does CorporateCulture Justify Defensive Measures to Takeover Attempts? 42
BAYLOR L. REV. 791, 793-804 (1990). For more general discussion, see T. DEAL & A.
KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF CORPORATE LIFE (1982);
T. PETERS & R. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S
BEST-RUN COMPANIES (1982); Edgar Schein, How Culture Forms, Develops, and
Changes, in R. KILMANN ET AL., GAINING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATE CULTURE (1985);
Richard Lidstad, Developing a CorporateCulture for the Maximum Balance Between
Utilization of Human Resources and Employee Fulfillment in the United States, 22
CAN. - U.S. L.J. 157 (1996).
119. See Lynn van Dyne et al., OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior: Construct Redefinition,Measurement, and Validation, 37 ACAD. MGT. J. 765, 765-67 (1994) (reconceptualizing organizational citizenship behavior as civic citizenship described in
political philosophy).
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Closing the Circle: Corporate Democracy in the New Workplace

The values drawn from the traditional governmental sphere coincide significantly and meaningfully with the values I have already
identified as animating the new workplace in the private sphere. The
primary emphasis of both is on the individual and the individual's
120
capacity for growth, self-determination, and self-actualization.
The aim of that self-actualization in the new workplace may be narrower in that it is directed at professional achievement, job satisfaction, and the sense of personal fulfillment that can flow from these
sources. 12 1 However, it is still clearly a part of the broad sense of
autonomy conceived by Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and the other Enlightenment-era political philosophers who were the architects of modem
democracy.122 The autonomy they perceived was, in modern parlance, to "go where you wanna go, do what you wanna do."1 23
Moreover, each of the three supporting categories of values identified in the governmental sphere can also be seen as operative in the
new workplace. The most salient of these in both contexts are the
political values, especially the value of participation, in part because
these political values underscore the significance of personal autonomy and dignity interests that are central to the core of both governmental democracy and the new private workplace. As with public
governance, participation also has been the primary context in which
democracy has been understood in the organizational context,
through such means as the encouragement of employee ownership,
employee access to voting rights, "open book" management, greater
employee communication, and greater organizational capacity. 124
Unlike in the governmental context, however, participation does not
lead to majoritarian rule in the business environment. Rather, participation leads to greater involvement in the shaping of organizational decisions, policies, procedures, etc., and in turn, their greater
understanding and acceptance. This phenomenon has been called
the "process control" effect 125 or the "voice" effect. 1 26
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Green, DisparateTreatment Theory, supra note 42.
See, e.g., COHEN & PRUSAK, supra note 6.
For a general discussion, see CROCKER, supra note 103, at 1-30.
The Mamas and the Papas, Go Where You Wanna Go, on IF You CAN

BELIEVE

YOUR EYES AND EARS (MCA 1966).

124. See McRitchie, supra note 95, at 32; JOYCE ROTHSCHILD & J. ALLEN WHIT,
THE COOPERATIVE WORKPLACE: POTENTIALS AND DILEMMAS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 145-59 (1986) (workers more satisfied in firms that have
democratic orientation).
125. John Thibault & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure,66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
546-47 (1978).
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As in the governmental context, transparency and rationality are
vital political participation values of the new workplace because they
foster an environment of openness and constructive communication
that both welcomes employee contribution and fosters a more trusting and cooperative workplace relationship between and among employers and employees. Clearly, not all management or institutional
decisions can or should be made in the public forum of the workplace;
public discussion of personnel, task assignment, and other such issues could be quite counterproductive if made in a public way. (Reasonable minds may, of course, disagree on where the line should
appropriately be drawn, but one should be drawn nonetheless.) The
organizational behavior literature confirms that the more transparent a workplace makes the reasons behind its policies, major decisions, and goals, 127 and the more those reasons are rational and
consistent with the actual and psychological contracts governing the
workplace, the more workers will align their behavior with the company's expectations for the present and vision for the future. Similarly, the more the companies are willing to promote open and
effective communication of workplace needs, interests, opportunities,
and concerns, and the more both employees and employers are willing to be responsive to them, the more the benefits of transparency
and rationality may be felt to nurture workplace trust, OCB, and performance. 128 To be sure, responsiveness in this sense does not contemplate agreement. Rather, responsiveness contemplates
1 29
understanding and somehow acknowledging that understanding,
126. Robert Folger, Distributive and ProceduralJustice: The Combined Improvement of "Voice" and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 108, 115-18 (1977).
127. See, e.g., Nic Beech & Oliver Crane, High Performance Teams and a Climate
of Community, 5 TEAM PERFORMANCE MGT. 87 (1999) (finding transparency of decision
making significant in making transition from normal to high performance teams);
Lisa C. Abrams et al., Nurturing Interpersonal Trust in Knowledge-Sharing Networks, 17 AcAD. MGT. ExEc. 64 (2003) (finding relationship between transparency in
decision making and trust of workers in the knowledge-sharing context); McRitchie,
supra note 95, at n.9 (citing 1987 General Accounting Office study finding 52 percent
higher productivity growth rate by companies with significant employee ownership
and participation in decision making).
128. See Jacqueline Mayfield & Milton Mayfield, Leader Communication Strategies: Critical Paths to Improving Employee Commitment, 20 AM. Bus. REv., June
2002, at 89, 90 ("Communication is a powerful catalyst for establishing and sustaining trust, the emotional state that is shared by highly committed workers and
leaders. Leader communication is the bridge that transmits behavioral intent to employees, thus creating the foundation for trust.").
129. Conceptually, this is similar to the notion of empathy. See ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DisPUTES 46-50 (2000).
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engaging rather than ignoring or trivializing difficult issues, and pro30
viding a path to real organizational learning.'
These autonomy values and political values are balanced by accountability. Democratic participation implies that one will participate responsibly, as this set of values seeks to enable and empower
the individual to make choices and take actions based on those
choices. The natural consequence of choice, however, is accountability, especially in a social context like the workplace.' 3 ' In the workplace context, this translates into workers receiving the appropriate
rewards for jobs well done, as well as appropriate consequences for
13 2
failing to meet expectations.
In the same way, democracy's legal values of equality and due
process, dignitarian in nature, are promoted by formal and informal
management policies that treat workers fairly and equally in status
and opportunity. Formal workplace prohibitions against discrimination based on race, gender, and national origin are of course a matter
of federal and state law. 1 33 However, many companies go farther
than the minimum that law requires - for example, by extending
worker benefits to homosexual partners, 3 4 by doing business with
companies that promote values such as environmental protection or
international human rights, 35 by creating a culture in which

130. See supra note 71.
131. In recognizing the need to temper individual autonomy with social responsibility, Professor Christina Wells has adroitly noted that autonomy "is not about atomistic individuals but about social creatures entitled to respect for their dignity...
[and] .

.

. members of society .

.

. responsible for respecting the dignity of others."

Christina E. Wells, ReinvigoratingAutonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 16170 (1997) (drawing on Kantian theory for a social understanding of autonomy that
informs free speech theory).
132. See Kickul & Lester, supra note 110 and accompanying text; Frances A Viggiani, Democratic Hierarchies in the Workplace: Structural Dilemmas and Organizational Action, 18 ECON. & INDUST. DEM. 231, 231-60 (1997); Dave Anderson, Three
Keys to Accountability, 1 SUPERVISION 10, 10-11 (2004).
133. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
134. See, e.g., Robert Ristelheuber, Domestic PartnerBenefits Just Good Business,
22 ELECTRONIC BUSINESS TODAY, Nov. 1996, at 18 (discussing gay benefits policies as
vehicles of employee retention and listing companies that provide such benefits,
largely in high-tech industries); Keith H. Hammonds, Lotus Opens a Door for Gay
Partners,Bus. WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 80 (reporting on gay partners benefits policy of
the Lotus Development Corp.).

135. See, e.g., R. Bruce Hutton et al., Socially Responsible Investing: Growing Industries,New Opportunities,37 Bus. & Soc'y 281 (1998) (describing growth of socially
responsible investing industry).
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mistakes may be viewed as learning opportunities rather than sanctionable events, 136 by providing for employee "flex time,"1 3 7 and, I

would submit, by providing for a variety of means for resolving workplace-related disputes efficiently and effectively. 1 38 Such actions
send a powerful signal to employees, potential employees, and to the
outside world about the value that the company places on matters
affecting equality, due process, and dignity. Also, such actions contribute mightily to the employee and potential employee perception of
the employer's workplace as a desirable place to spend one's time or
do business with as a consumer or business partner.139 Finally, both
the public and private social capital research suggests that the fulfillment of democratic political and legal values in the workplace can be
expected to help foster a rich, vibrant corporate culture marked by
the interrelated values of reciprocity, trust, and OCB. Reciprocity
lies at the heart of social capital, which in its essence is a function of
human relationships and networks.1 40 In his seminal work, sociologist Alvin W. Gouldner theorized that the stability of a social system
depends in part on a "norm of reciprocity" among its members that
inhibits exploitation and serves to maintain the system.' 4 1 The reciprocity norm also tends to transcend normal egoistic motivation because people generally recognize that reciprocating good deeds
136.

See, e.g., Amit Somech & Anat Drach-Zahavy, OrganizationalCitizenshipBe-

haviorfrom an OrganizationalPerspective: The Relationship Between Organizational
Learning and Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 77 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG.
PSYCH. 281, 290-95 (2004) (finding organizational learning positively correlated to organizational citizenship behaviors that benefit both company and employee as
individual).
137. See, e.g., COHEN & PRusAK, supra note 6 (discussing flex time at Hewlett
Packard as part of "the HP way").
138. See Margaret Shaw, Designing and Implementing In-House Dispute Resolution Programs, SD70 ALI-ABA 447 (1999).
139. A. K. Mishra & G. M. Spreitzer, To Stay or To Go: Voluntary Survivor Turnover Following an OrganizationalDownsizing, 23 J. ORG. BEHAV. 707 (2002) (finding
trustworthiness of management, distributive justice, procedural justice, and certain
dimensions of empowerment facilitate organizational attachment, which in turn facilitates less voluntary turnover in year following corporate downsizing); Thomas R.
Mitchell & Thomas W. Lee, The Unfolding Model of Job Turn-Over and Job Embeddedness: Foundations for a Comprehensive Theory of Attachment, 23 RESEARCH IN
ORG. BEHAV. 198 (2001) (suggesting majority of those who voluntarily leave a company do so because of a great shock that causes employee to rethink relationship with
employer).
140. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Together, 14 THE OECD OBSERVER, Mar.
2004, at 14 ("[Slocial capital refers to social networks and the associated norms of
reciprocity.").
141. See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity:A PreliminaryStatement, 25
AM. Soc. REV. 25, 161-178 (1960); Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical
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increases one's chance of receiving benefits in the future. While individuals may benefit by defecting from the norm, the norm itself tends
14 2
to inhibit such exploitation.
The reciprocity norm can have a powerful cycling effect. When
animated by constructive workplace behaviors, the reciprocity norm
can lead to a "virtuous cycle," where total OCB increases as the result
of repeated reciprocal helping, courtesy, sportsmanship, civic virtue,
and other such behaviors between employees. 143 However, when
animated by such destructive workplace behaviors as cynicism, jealousy, and selfishness, the reciprocity norm can lead to a "vicious" cycle in which employees withhold help and other organizational
citizenship behaviors from each other because they themselves do not
receive help. 144 Worse yet, the result can lead to a reciprocity norm
of workplace deviant behavior ("WDB") rather than OCB, 145 where
workers engage in behaviors that affirmatively undermine the efforts
of co-workers or the larger goals of management.
One area in which this reciprocity norm is particularly important
is in organizational trust, an essential value in the new workplace,
with respect to both vertical trust among workers, and horizontal
trust between workers and management. 1 46 As noted above, the psychological contract that supports the new workplace is one where the
company effectively agrees to provide an environment in which the
employee can grow and be successful in ways meaningful to that individual employee, while the employee agrees to make best use of that
Behavior:A Social Network Perspective, 23 ACAD. OF MGT. REV. 14, 14-31 (1998) [hereinafter Brass et al.].
142. See John R. Deckop, Carol C. Cirka, Lynne M. Andersson, Doing Unto Others:
The Reciprocity of Helping Behavior in Organizations,47 J. OF Bus. ETHICS 101, 10305 (citing M. Masuch, Vicious Cycles in Organizations, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 14 (1985));
Brass et al., supra note 141.
143. For a more detailed discussion, see Deckop et al., supra note 142, at 103-05.
144. Id. at 107-09. For more on vicious cycles, see Michael Masuch, Vicious Cycles
in Organizations,30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 14 (1985).
145. See Deckop et al., supra note 142; see also Patrick D. Dunlop & Kibeom Lee,
Workplace Deviance, OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior, and Business Unit Performance: The Bad Apples Do Spoil the Whole Barrel, 25 J. ORG. BEHAV. 67, 69-70
(2004).
146. See, e.g., Scott W. Lester & Holly H. Brower, In the Eye of the Beholder: The
Relationship Between Subordinates'Felt Trustworthiness and Their Work Attitudes
and Behaviors, 10 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 17, 24-26 (2003) [hereinafter Lester &
Brower] (finding positive relationship between felt trustworthiness and performance,
organizational citizenship behavior, and job satisfaction); Samuel Aryee et al., Trust
as a Mediator of the Relationship Between Organizational Justice and Work Outcomes: Test of the Social Exchange Model, 23 J. ORG. BEHAV. 267, 271-82 (2002).
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opportunity on behalf of the company. 14 7 It is essential to the stability of the relationship that each side trust the other to perform according to the general expectations of the psychological contract.'14
A corporate culture imbued with the democratic political, legal, and
social capital values that include autonomy, participation, transparency, responsiveness, and equal, fair and respectful treatment
promotes this trust, 149 and fosters a sense of social connection between employees as members of a family or team rather than the assembly-line automatons of the old workplace.' 50 Accelerated by the
interactive reciprocity effect, shared values quickly become group
norms that have a powerful compliance effect.' 5 ' As group norms coalesce around substantive democratic values, they act to provide a
stable basis upon which the more fluid and conditional new workplace can be erected. In this way, reciprocity and trust come together
to foster organizational citizenship behavior.
IV.

ARBITRATION, THE NEW WORKPLACE,
AND CORPORATE DEMOCRACY

In the preceding parts, I have described the changed nature of
the workplace, the fluidity of the structure of the new workplace, and
the democratic character of the values that support it. In this Part, I
will address the conflict resolution component of the new workplace.
This is appropriate because conflict is inevitable, even in the most
democratic of workplaces. It is important because conflict can have
constructive effects just as it can have destructive effects,' 52 and one
of the things that will distinguish more desirable workplaces in the
modern era is whether those inevitable conflicts are managed effectively and constructively. In workplaces oriented toward democratic
147. See Rousseau, supra note 21, at 128-29.
148. The failure to meet these expectations is the very definition of breach of trust.
See Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Trust in Relationships: A Model of
Development and Decline, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS INSPIRED
BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 133, 165-67 (Barbara Benedict Bunker & Jeffrey

Z. Rubin eds., 1995) [hereinafter Lewicki & Bunker].
149. See Michael Maccoby, Creating Quality Cultures in the East and West, 37
RES. TECH. MGT., Jan/Feb. 1994, at 57 ("Trust .. . is maintained by open dialogue
about expectations in an ever-changing environment. Trust can also be increased by
involving employees and their representatives in the strategic planning process, so
that they can influence change to take account in their interests.").
150. See ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 23-29.
151. See Ronald J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 166, 175 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman
eds., 2000).
152. Constructive effects of conflict include the fostering of greater understanding,
improved social relationships, and social progress. PRUITT, supra note 70, at 10-11.
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values, constructive conflict resolution will be promoted when the
processes of dispute resolution themselves operate in a way that vindicate rather than diminish democratic workplace values - that is,
when the processes have a strong democratic character when measured according to the political, legal, and social capital values I have
discussed. In this Part IV, I will analyze the democratic character of
the primary dispute resolution methods, beginning with public adjudication, before turning to arbitration and then finally to mediation.
With respect to arbitration, I will focus on arbitrations conducted
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") because that is the principle legal regime governing non-union employment arbitration in the
new workplace. For the sake of organizational clarity, I will first address the political and legal democratic characteristics of arbitration
and mediation separately, before consolidating discussion of the autonomy and social capital characteristics.
A.

The Democratic Characterof Dispute Resolution
1.

Public Adjudication

It is helpful to begin analysis of the democratic character of dispute resolution in the workplace with public adjudication because it
is the presumptive method by which formal non-union workplace disputes will be resolved. 1 53 As I have defined it elsewhere, public adjudication, the right to go to court, is "democracy's endowment for
dispute resolution,"1 5 4 the presumptive venue in which formalized
workplace disputes will be resolved in the absence of alternative measures. Analysis of the democratic character of dispute resolution in
this context therefore also provides an important baseline against
which other dispute resolution methods may be assessed.
Not surprisingly, public adjudication exhibits a strong democratic character.' 5 5 Courts promote public participation in the development and administration of the rule of law by allowing parties to
bring actions to enforce legal rights, by providing for jury service in
153. By formal disputes, I refer to those disputes that have escalated to the point
where there is some kind of formal claiming of rights. Many if not most disputes are
resolved by less formal means. For arguments that informal dispute resolution wholly removed from law - is the primary means by which disputes are actually resolved, see William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.. , 15 L.& Soc'Y. REV. 631, 633-37 (1981); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 6-11 (1983).

154. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 293-95 and accompanying text.
155. For a fuller discussion, see id. at 287-93.
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certain public adjudications, 156 and by articulating and maintaining
societal expectations about the legal consequences of conduct that
guides private ordering. 157 Similarly, courts promote equality, due
process, and rationality by operating in accordance with specific rules
of procedure, evidence, and substantive law that have been enacted
pursuant to statutory or administrative prescription, or which have
evolved over time at common law. 158 There is also significant accountability and transparency in trial court decision-making through
the availability of judicial review of trial level decisions, 15 9 as well as
the public nature of trials and appellate argument. 160 Finally, as instruments of the rule of law, courts help generate a rich reserve of
social capital that further reinforces compliance with the rule of
16 1
law.
2.

The Democratic Characterof Arbitration Under the Federal
Arbitration Act

Unlike public adjudication, arbitration is a private, informal adjudicatory process in which the disputing parties authorize a third
party to issue a decision in their dispute. 62 This is commonly effected through a contractual arbitration provision that lays out the
scope of the arbitrator's authority, the binding character of the decision (or arbitral award), as well as conditions, limits, or obligations
163
on the arbitrator in exercising that authority.
Since the rise of the labor movement in the early twentieth century, arbitration has been a fixture in the unionized workplace.16 4 In
the 1980s and 1990s, the range of arbitration expanded significantly
to cover the non-union employment context, largely under the authority of the Federal Arbitration Act. 165 The FAA was enacted in
156. See id. at 288 and sources cited therein.
157. See id. at 310 and sources cited therein.
158. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 293-95 and sources cited therein.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 310-18 and discussion therein.
161. See id. at 310-12 and sources cited therein.
162. For an argument that arbitrations conducted under the FAA are public
rather than private in nature because of the presence of state action, see Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949, 989-1017 (2000) [hereinafter Reuben, Constitutional Gravity].
163. See 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw § 1.1.3.2 (Supp.
1999).
164. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 74.
165. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (compelling arbitration of securities fraud claims under the 1933 Act and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (compelling
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1925 primarily to reverse legislatively the historic "ouster doctrine,"
a centuries-old common law doctrine under which courts refused to
enforce agreements to arbitrate. 16 6 In particular, the Act provides
that arbitration agreements will be enforced just like any other
agreement, as long as the agreement is enforceable as a matter of
contract law. 16 7 It further permits a court to compel an unwilling
party into arbitration if it is satisfied that there is an enforceable
69
agreement to arbitrate, 168 and to stay related legal proceedings.'
If the endowment of public adjudication in the United States provides a baseline against which the democratic character of other dispute resolution processes may be measured, arbitration under the
FAA tends to fall short of the mark in many important respects. To
be sure, arbitration permits party participation, arguably at a higher
level than adjudication, considering that the informality of the arbitration process can overcome formal barriers to party participation,
such as the prohibitions against hearsay evidence. 170 However, arbitration provides little accountability, 17 1 as arbitration awards are
generally not subject to the substantive review that is available for
decisions in public adjudication. 1 72 Rather, review is limited to
securities fraud claims under the 1934 Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (compelling arbitration of federal age discrimination claim).
166. For a definitive legislative history of the FAA, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION

(1992).

167. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (2000); 7 U.L.A. 1
(1997).
168. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1999).
169. The "court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1999).
170. There is some constraint on the participation value when contrasted with
public adjudication, because arbitration under the FAA does not contemplate a role
for public participation, such as through jury service. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). To the contrary, arbitration is private justice. For
a book predicated upon the idea that all of alternative dispute resolution is private
justice, see KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000).

171. For a response to the argument that accountability in arbitration is provided
by the private marketplace, see Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 300-01.
172. While courts have frequently cited their inherent authority to overturn arbitration decisions that are substantively in manifest disregard of the law, it is rare for
a court to actually take such a step. For the unusual situation in which a court permitted further proceedings on manifest disregard grounds, see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1997). For a general discussion, see Stephen L.
Hayford, Reining in the "ManifestDisregard"of the Law Standard:The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DIsP. RESOL. 117 (1998).
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misconduct on behalf of the arbitrator 17 3 or other procedural defects. 17 4 Similarly, transparency and rationality are not essential values of arbitration. Arbitrators are generally not required to
articulate reasons for their decisions in the form of written opinions, 1 75 effectively precluding substantive judicial review of arbitral
awards. 176 Moreover, arbitrators do not have to make their decisions
according to rules of law, which can make their awards appear arbitrary or capricious to those unfamiliar with the industry customs or
17 7
practices upon which a decision may be based.
Because of the enormous decisional discretion vested in arbitrators, arbitration does not, and arguably should not, provide any assurance of equal treatment of similar parties in different cases, at
least in the sense of the application of substantive rules. Quite to the
contrary, arbitration provides a highly individualized form of justice
that is narrowly tailored to the specific circumstances presented to
the arbitrator, who makes a decision according to whatever substantive standard he or she determines is appropriate under the circum178
stances, unless the submission to arbitration specifies otherwise.
On the other hand, arbitration does provide for equal treatment in
the sense of procedural due process,'17 9 generally assuring that both
parties within the arbitration will be treated equally with respect to
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT. § 23(a) (2000).
174. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2002); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 24 (2000).
175. See 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAw § 37.4.1 (Supp.
1999). For a more detailed analysis, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity,
supra note 162, at 1082-91. The industry is moving toward a user choice model on
this issue, however. Id. at 1082-85.
176. Such concerns have animated the debate over the depublishing of judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (Arnold,
J.) (discussing Anglo-American history of precedent in finding federal circuit court
rule prohibiting use of unpublished opinions unconstitutional under Article III). For a
contrary view, though, see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2001). See generally Development and Practice Note, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "NoCitation" Rules, 3 J.APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 169, 169-70 (2001). For a discussion of
similar issues raised by the decertification of judicial opinions, see William Wesley
Patton, Publication,Depublication and Review of State Bar Court Opinions:Bringing
the Public into the Process, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 409 (1996).
177. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 302.
178. Parties, of course, can direct the arbitrator to apply certain standards, and
not apply other standards, in their submissions to arbitration.

179. Arbitration submissions routinely include or incorporate by reference specific
rules by which the arbitration is to be conducted, such as the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. See Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures (including Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes) (amend. July 1, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=
15747 & JSPsrc =upload \ LIVESITE \ RulesProcedures \ NationalInternational \..
. .\focusArea\ commercial \AAA235current.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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the presentation of evidence to the arbitrator.' 8 0 While the practices

of individual arbitrators in this regard may vary considerably, the
market for arbitration cases, and other reputational concerns, tend to
constrain abuse of discretion by arbitrators.' 8 '
3.

The Democratic Characterof Mediation

As a consensual dispute resolution process requiring the consent
of the parties before a dispute can be resolved, mediation may generally be seen as an inherently more democratic process than an adjudicatory process like arbitration. However, the enormous variety of
styles, practices, and applications of mediation raise uncertainty on
several democratic elements - a dynamic that gives rise to some of

the most significant, contentious, and largely unresolved policy issues in the field. In my view, democratic theory would suggest that
the answers to these fundamental dilemmas may be ascertained by
reference to the autonomy value - that is, the capacity for mediation

to foster true and meaningful self-determination for the parties in the
resolution of their disputes.182
The political democratic factors present a particularly mixed bag,
in part because of the adaptability of mediation to unique circumstances that makes the process valuable in the first place. While the
mediation process generally allows for a high degree of participation
180. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting as unconscionable an arbitration provision that limited remedies, depositions,
and bound only the employee, among other abuses); Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (arbitration provision requiring only
employee to arbitrate, and even then not affording full statutory remedies, was substantively unconscionable); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981)
(music industry arbitration provision requiring nonunion members to arbitrate before
union arbitration panel was substantively unconscionable). For a discussion with extensive case citations, see F. PAUL BLAND, JR. ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER, CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

§§ 4.1-4.4 (3d ed. 2003).

181. For more on reputational markets of lawyers in the negotiation context, see
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 509, 522-34 (1994) (discussing constraining effect of reputational norms on potential unethical behavior by
lawyers).
182. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text. Self-determination is a core
value of the mediation process. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS § I (American Bar Association, American Arbitration Association, and the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 1994) ("Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the
ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement."); MODEL STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 1A (2001) ("Self-determination is
the fundamental principle of family mediation. The mediation process relies upon the
ability of participants to make their own voluntary and informed decisions.").
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by disputants,18 3 the transparency of the process greatly depends
upon the particular mediation format that is used. For example, noncaucus models are plainly more transparent to the parties than the
arguably more common models in which private caucuses are used,
and through which information crucial to settlement is deliberately
shielded from one of the parties by the mediator and the other party,
absent party consent.1 8 4 Indeed, maintaining the appearance of neutrality while working effectively with private caucus information is a
central challenge for practicing mediators who work with the caucus
format.' 8 5 Surely this shield of the caucus works both ways in that
mediators will typically caucus with both parties. However, one
should not confuse even-handedness with transparency. Caucuses
shield information, and that is the antithesis of transparency.
Similarly, mediation is not a particularly rational process as
compared with our baseline of public adjudication because one of the
strengths of the mediation process is the ability of the parties to
make decisions about the outcomes of their disputes according to values and standards that are uniquely important to them rather than
according to pre-determined legal, workplace, or other standards. As
a result, decision making in mediation is more of an idiosyncratic process, rather than one guided by more objective rationality. While this
is entirely appropriate, it can raise an enormous practical challenge
in assessing the substantive fairness of a mediated settlement agreement, particularly one that falls well short of what the law may provide, but which satisfies other interests of the parties, including just
86
resolving the dispute.
183.

This may be more true for less sophisticated cases, such as routine contract,

tort, and landlord-tenant cases, than for more sophisticated cases such as complex
commercial matters, antitrust, and bankruptcy matters, in which counsel is likely to
represent parties. See, e.g., Jacob Aaron Escher, ADR Comes to Bankruptcy, 9 Disp.
RESOL. MAG, Summer 2003, at 29; Howard Adler & Richard Chernick, The Expanding
Role of ADR in Antitrust Cases, 9 DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 34.
184. For a discussion of the pros and cons of mediation caucuses, see JAMES J.
ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 131-32 (2001); MEDIATING LEGAL DIsPUTES § 3.2, at 68 (Dwight Golann ed., 1996) (describing avoidance of caucuses in family mediation context).
185. This is reflected in the ongoing professional debate over whether mediators
have an obligation to assure the fairness of mediated settlement agreements. Compare, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (arguing in favor of such an obligation) with SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 2:6-2:7 (2d ed.
2003) (arguing that mediator efforts to assure fairness would risk mediator
impartiality).
186. See, e.g., Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Deal Killer or Deal Saver? The
Consulting Lawyer's Dilemma, 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 7.
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The mediation process is similarly ambiguous on the final political value, accountability. On the one hand, because mediation parties
are not required to settle, they arguably have all the accountability
they need.187 However, this view does not take into account coercive
pressures that the -mediator can bring to bear on parties in mediation, particularly mediators who use a more directive or cajoling
style,1 8 8 as well as other settlement pressures, such as time, resources, and the need for a party to move on. Moreover, this view
focuses on particular disputes, and a look at the system as a whole
underscores the lack of accountability in mediation. Mediators are
not licensed or certified in most states, and so are not accountable to
public oversight other than through private actions for malpractice or
ethical lapses,1 8 9 and through the reputational market for mediator
services. 1 90 Moreover, unlike most contracts, the results of mediated
settlement agreements cannot generally be reviewed for substantive
fairness, or even unconscionability. 19 1 While in most cases there is no
need for such review, democracy's concern would be with those cases
for which review is appropriate because of undue mediator coercion,

187. For an article generally arguing that disputes are private matters, a view
that would support the form of internal accountability I have described, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). But see David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the PublicRealm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (settlement
erodes public realm); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-90
(1983) (making the seminal argument).
188. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Trashing,Bashing and HashingIt Out: Is This the
End of "Good Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Nancy A. Welsh, Making
Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got to Do with It? 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 787, 817-26 (2001).
189. Mediators continue to argue for immunity, but the law has been reluctant to
oblige. The Uniform Mediation Act, for example, rejected mediator immunity in favor
of a mediator liability model of accountability. See Memorandum from Richard C.
Reuben, Reporter, ABA UMA Drafting Committee, to Friends of the Mediation Law
Project, Changes to the June 1999 Draft (Nov. 16, 1999) (copy on file with author)
(deletion of immunity). On mediator liability generally, see Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways
to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2003).
190. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
191. Courts are generally reluctant to vacate mediated settlement agreements on
substantive grounds, such as unconscionability. See, e.g., Zhu v. Countrywide Realty
Co., No. 02-3087, 2003 WL 21399026, at *843 (10th Cir. June 18, 2003) (unpublished)
(rejecting unconscionability challenge); Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d
1196, 1199 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting unconscionability, economic duress, undue
influence, and coercion claims for lack of evidence in upholding mediated settlement
agreement); but see Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094, 1099-1100 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (remanded decision, arguing that mediated settlement agreement
can be set aside for mediator misconduct).
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party incompetence, or other circumstances suggesting a lack of
meaningful autonomy by the disputing parties.
Finally, the mediation process raises similar democratic ambiguity on the legal values of due process and equality. A standard practice of mediators is to work with the parties to establish ground rules
for the conduct of the mediation to which both parties agree, and this
192
is strongly democratic in terms of assuring procedural due process.
However, both the substantive due process and the equality components of democratic dispute resolution implicate concerns over mediator style in general, and competence to manage power imbalances
between the parties in particular. The traditional theoretical divide
193
on mediator style is between facilitative and evaluative mediation,
or what Professor Riskin has more recently termed "elicitative" and
"directive."'1 94 In my view, democratic theory holds no preference for
one style over the other. Facilitative mediation has great power to
enhance party autonomy in the resolution of a dispute, assuming the
mediator is skillful in managing power disparities between the parties. If the mediator is not capable of managing a power imbalance
effectively, however, the result can be the suppression of the meaningful autonomy of the low-power party, or, worse yet, the direct or
indirect coercion of that party's choices. 195 Similarly, in the best of
worlds, evaluative mediation can foster meaningful party autonomy
by providing a hard-headed third-party assessment of a party's
claims; in the worst, it can be just another tool of coercion and suppression, the antithesis of party empowerment. Particularly in more
extreme situations, such a dynamic could affect the democratic character of mediation by raising significant issues regarding the substantive fairness of the mediated settlement agreements, as well as
the equality of treatment of the low-power party.

192.

See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 184, at 116-17.
193. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies,and Techniques: A Guide for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 7 (1996).
It should be noted that Riskin's grid was quadratic, also distinguishing mediation
style by reference to the breadth of the definition of the problem to be mediated.
194. Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the
New New Grid System,79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29-34 (2003).
195. Family mediation remains the paradigmatic example. See, e.g., Trina Grillo,
The MediationAlternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L. REV. 1545 (1991);
Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
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Autonomy and Implications for OrganizationalSystems Design
1.

The Autonomy Value

As I suggested earlier, the autonomy value has a dominating effect that can help resolve tensions when the other values are burdened or in tension, such as with both arbitration and mediation.
Because the autonomy value applies differently in arbitration and
mediation, each is discussed separately below.
a)

Arbitration

The greatest departure from democratic norms under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as the arbitration process's greatest potential for democratic legitimacy, is in the area of personal
autonomy. 196 The issue is complex but fundamental. On the surface,
it would seem axiomatic to conclude that voluntary arbitration promotes personal autonomy, while mandatory and binding arbitration
frustrates it. A person compelled into arbitration over his or her opposition cannot be said to have chosen to submit to the process.
The problem is more complex, however, because it ultimately requires a policy decision as to the level at which the principle of autonomy is to be applied: at the more general level of the agreement to
enter into the transaction, or at the more specific level of the agreement to arbitrate a dispute arising out of that transaction. For example, if an employee takes a job at a company where the terms and
conditions of employment, as stated in the employment manual, require workplace disputes to be decided by mandatory and binding arbitration, the employee may be said to have impliedly assented to the
arbitration provision by virtue of accepting the job. 197 Although not
always expressed as such, this view has some support in the courts.
However, for reasons I have detailed elsewhere, 198 I see this result as
inappropriate under law because public adjudication rights are an
endowment of democracy for dispute resolution, and while they can
certainly be waived, 1 99 the right to make that choice is so fundamental to the legitimacy of the rule of law and democratic governance
that it may not be subject to rules of implied waiver. 20 0 Rather, if it
196.

See Ackerman, supra note 97, at 67-71.

197. See, e.g., Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.
1997) (enforcing arbitration provision in employment manual).
198.
199.

See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 293-95.
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490

U.S. 477,

485 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (right to select judicial
forum may not be waived)).
200. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 11, at 293-95.
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is going to be waived, democratic theory would suggest that waiver
20
must be at least "clear and unmistakable."

1

It is fair to say that courts generally have not yet reached this
result. Rather, the operating assumption of many courts since the
early 1990s has been that unilaterally imposed arbitration requirements are permissible, 20 2 although there is some sign of retrenchment, 20 3 particularly with respect to judicial concerns about the
conscionability of one-sided arbitration agreements. 20 4 However, the
decision rests at a different level in the organizational context. It
rests at the level of dispute resolution systems design. Designers
have an enormous array of options in structuring dispute resolution
systems to fit the unique interests, needs, and concerns of a particular workplace. 20 5 Crucial choices include not only which type of dispute resolution method should be employed and at which stage of the
development of the dispute, but also whether worker participation is
to be voluntary or compelled. 20 6 Democratic theory, as I have described its application in the new workplace context, would expect
that this design discretion be exercised in favor of voluntary arbitration processes because it is voluntariness that promotes the autonomy and dignitarian interests in the new workplace, as well as the
preservation of meaningful employee choices within the process (such
as in the selection of the arbitrator, the time and location of arbitral
hearings, and whether the arbitrator should issue a written and reasoned opinion). Indeed voluntariness in some respects defines autonomy when it comes to exercises of decisional discretion. By contrast,
a unilaterally imposed dispute resolution process is the antithesis of
201.

This language is in quotation marks because it is the language that is cur-

rently used by the U.S. Supreme Court to describe the character of this higher standard for waiver, in cases in which that issue is a concern. See, e.g., First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-46 (1995); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration,and the Demise of Separability:RestoringAccess to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 857-862 (2003)
[hereinafter Reuben, First Options] (discussing "clear and unmistakable" standard).
202. The leading case is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (upholding the mandatory arbitration of a claim arising under the Age Dis-

crimination in Employment Act).
203. See Reuben, First Options, supra note 201, at 849-50, 873 (arguing that recent U.S. Supreme Court cases appear to reject implied consent theory in requiring
"clear and unmistakable" assent to arbitration, and calling for the court to clarify this
tension).
204. See supra note 201 and sources cited therein.
205. For a concise review of the literature in the field, see John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-FaithParticipationin Court-Connected
Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 141 n.232 (2002).
206. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 6:4, 6:15-6:20
(2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2001).
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autonomy, at least for the adhered party. There is no room for the
individual exercise of decisional discretion; the path of conduct is
prescribed.
b)

Mediation

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the application of autonomy in mediation also can be seen on two levels: entry into the process and party choices about the process within the process. We have
already discussed the autonomy implications for party choices with
respect to mediation style and competency, 20 7 but the autonomy implications for entry into the process merit further discussion.
As with arbitration, entry into the mediation process is only
problematic from the perspective of democratic theory when it is unilaterally imposed rather than voluntarily selected. However, it is arguably less problematic than arbitration because the process is
consensual and the parties in mediation always have the right not to
settle. Professor Frank Sander has articulated this view, arguing
that parties can be mandated into mediation, but cannot be required
to settle. 20 8 It is upon this principle that many federal and state
courts have adopted mandatory mediation programs for some or all
civil cases. 20 9 From the perspective of democratic theory, such an approach, while arguably acceptable, is undesirable in my view.
Much of the discussion around mandatory mediation has taken
place in the context of court-related programs rather than corporate
programs, and the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there is considerable empirical evidence that parties like the mediation process
once they get into it, achieve similar outcomes to those reached in
non-mandatory cases, and tend to be satisfied with the outcomes
achieved in the mediations. 2 10 Moreover, there is some empirical research that suggests that both parties and their lawyers are more
likely to use mediation if they have already used the process in the
past, and that prior experience with mediation is the best predictor of
the likelihood of lawyers choosing or recommending mediation to
207.

See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.

208.

See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 3, 7-8

(2000).
209. See KATHRYN VAN WEZEL STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAw OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 859 (2000) (discussing how "several states, including Texas,
Florida, and California, require parties to engage in mandatory mediation before they
can obtain a trial in certain types of civil cases").
210. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of MandatoryMediation: Empiri-

cal Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565 (1997).
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their clients. 2 11 To be sure, mandatory mediation in court-related
programs has played an important role in the institutionalization of
mediation today. On the other hand, there is also considerable anecdotal evidence that mandatory court-related mediation has significant unintended and deleterious consequences. 2 12 For example,
attorneys in mandatory mediation jurisdictions often view it as a procedural formality requiring token compliance that must be taken on
the road to trial, inspiring both cynicism and resentment of the
process.
This in turn raises the question of the nature of participation in
the process - that is, just how cooperative does one have to be in a
mandatory mediation, and for how long, in order to comply with a
mandatory mediation requirement? Many states have responded to
this question by imposing requirements for so-called "good faith" participation in mediation. Such requirements have long been controversial and difficult to implement,21 3 and as Professor John Lande
has discussed at length, attempts at their enforcement only raise
more questions. 21 4 This dynamic again undermines the legitimacy of
mediation as a truly alternative process. Finally, for these and other
reasons, there is ample anecdotal evidence that the institutionalization of mandatory mediation in court programs can shift the nature of
mediation away from its broader interest-based roots and toward a
narrower, more evaluative or directive style of mediation. While such
a shift may have the benefit of responsiveness to perceived party
needs in some cases, it is a far cry from the effort to establish a truly
alternative process that allows parties to use disputes to satisfy
deeper interests and needs that gave the mediation movement its
force and moral authority.
2. Implications for Systems Design
The key implication for dispute resolution systems design is that
dispute resolution methods should be integrated into the workplace
211. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the
Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 831, 845 (1998) (citing analysis of Ohio survey, in Roselle Wissler, Ohio
Attorneys' Experience with and Views of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures 1
(Mar. 1996) (on file with authors)).
212. For a general discussion of standard criticisms of mandatory mediation, see
Wissler, supra note 211, at 571-75.
213. For a discussion and review of the voluminous literature on "good faith," see
Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting"Good Faith"Reports Under the Uni-.
form Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003
J. Disp. RESOL. 67, 68-80 (2003) and sources cited therein.
214. See Lande, supra note 205.
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in such a way as to assure a high level of meaningful autonomy in the
employment of the ADR method. As we saw with arbitration and
even mediation, ADR methods generally include at least some antidemocratic elements, but this is where the autonomy value has a
dominating effect. Again, it is helpful to consider arbitration and mediation separately.
a) Arbitration
The democratic emphasis on voluntariness does not mean that
systems designers cannot incorporate arbitration into dispute resolution systems at all - or for that matter, that even mandatory arbitration is prohibited per se. To the contrary, there are a number of ways
in which arbitration can be integrated into dispute resolution systems, such that it promotes rather than defeats the goals of workplace democracy. Arbitration, for example, can be structured as a
post-dispute option to consider and employ if both parties agree. This
of course would be classic voluntary arbitration, and in my view is a
highly democratic and normatively desirable way to integrate arbitration into the new workplace. An even stronger variation of this
approach would be to make arbitration voluntary and non-binding,
meaning that workers are not bound to abide by the results if they
are dissatisfied or believe they will be able to achieve a more desirable result in court or through some other process. Under this approach, the arbitrator would essentially provide an advisory opinion
or early neutral evaluation (ENE). As the experience with ENE in
the Northern District of California has persuasively demonstrated,
such feedback to the parties can be enormously helpful in fostering
2 15
settlement.
However, one can conceive of at least two ways in which an employer's initial preference for arbitration can be structured into a dispute resolution system in a way that is consistent with democratic
norms. One way is to make the process mandatory but non-binding,
at least for the employee. Under this approach, which preserves
worker autonomy and self-determination as well as an employer's initial preference for arbitration, the employee would be required to arbitrate, but, as above, would not be required to accept that decision.
Again such a structure would essentially serve as an early neutral
215. See, e.g., Roger M. Deitz, EarlyNeutral Evaluation:A Catalystfor the Resolution of Securities Disputes, 949 PLI/CoRP 843, 848-850 (1996); Joshua D. Rosenberg &
H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 46 STAN. L.

1487, 1488-91 (1994) (evaluating ENE program in Northern District of
California).
REV.
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evaluation. This is the basis under which arbitration was once integrated into dispute resolution programs in public courts.2 1 6 As Professor Colvin has documented, it has also been used with success in
the private corporate context.217
A second way to structure an employer's initial preference for arbitration into the design of a dispute resolution system is to make it
mandatory only for the employer, and as an "opt-in" for the employee. 218 While some might suggest this provides autonomy only for
the workers, such a view overlooks the crucial fact that it is the employers who are designing the system, and therefore their choice to
arbitrate disputes arising under it is made when the arbitration component was factored into the overall systems design. 2 19 In this sense,
companies may even wish to consider devising incentives to encourage employees to take this option, such as providing funds for
2 20
legal or other representation in the arbitration.

216. See DONNA STIENSTRA & ELIZABETH PLAPINGER,
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 4-5, 29-35 (1996) (describing

ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE
declining use of arbitration in
federal courts). For a general discussion, see Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory:The ConstitutionalIssues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 515 (1989)
[hereinafter Golann].
217. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitrationand the Reconfigurationof Workplace DisputeResolution, 14 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 7-26, on file with author).
218. For a case study of an opt-in program, see Alexander J.S. Colvin, Adoption
and Use of Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Non-Union Workplace, 13 ADVANCES
IN LAB. & INDUS. REL. 71, 82-89 (analyzing TRW's mandatory arbitration program,
which is binding only on the employer in order to be consistent with TRW's overall
human resource philosophy). Some companies have implemented "opt out" programs,
in which disputes are resolved by mandatory and binding arbitration unless the employee opts out of arbitration. While more democratic than traditional mandatory
and binding programs, they suffer by the possibility of an employee waiving trial and
related rights inadvertently because he or she didn't know about the possibility of
opting out in a timely manner. Much would depend upon the notice given to an employee under a particular opt-out program. If it was provided after the dispute, then

the waiver would be sufficiently voluntary to satisfy democracy-related concerns. For
judicial opinions approving opt-out programs, see see Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d
1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (employee contract included opportunity to opt out of im-

posed arbitration, which employee failed to exercise); see also Circuit City v. Najd, 294
F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) (opt-out provision not procedurally unconscionable).
219. Fair concerns could also be raised about the influence of coerciveness on such
a choice, particularly if the particular job is in an industry dominated by arbitration,
such as the securities industry.
220. See, e.g., John W. Zinsser, Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows but Some Questions Persist, 12 NEGOT. J. 149 (1996) (discussing Brown &
Root program).
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b) Mediation
As with arbitration, the key implication for systems design is
that mediation programs for the new workplace should be designed in
way that maximizes party autonomy along several different dimensions. First, experience with mandatory mediation in the court-related context suggests that mediation should be offered on a
voluntary basis in the employment context to support the legitimacy
of the process and to reaffirm the principle of autonomy that are so
vital to the legitimacy of both the mediation process and to the values
of the new workplace. Tiered or multi-step dispute resolution
processes that include mediation and other types of processes are
common in the business context, 2 2 1 and implementing this principle
need not impinge upon such programs. Rather, new workplace employers simply need to structure them in a way that is fair and attractive, and provides incentives for employees to take advantage of
them.
Similarly, systems designers should factor autonomy into mediation by allowing employees greater participation in the structural
choices for the mediation in which they will be participating. An obvious example is in the selection of the mediator. While it is fine to
offer employees the option of an in-house mediator, designers should
be mindful of the appearance of partiality or bias that such an option
may carry (and its potential to diminish the equality and due process
democratic values), and offer a list of other mediators that are acceptable to the employer that the employee might also consider. Similarly, employees should be empowered and encouraged to find out
about the styles that the mediators use to determine whether, under
the circumstances, for example, they would prefer a mediator who is
more elicitive or more directive, or a mediator who prefers a caucus or
a non-caucus model, or who is particularly skilled at managing power
imbalances, disabilities, and other such issues that might be particularly salient for a particular party in a particular dispute. 22 2 Finally,
dispute systems designers should incorporate procedures that empower and encourage the employers and employees to seek counsel to
1

221.
ING

See, e.g., Scanlon & Mann, supra note 77; CATHERINE

ADR

INTO THE CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT:

ADR

CRONIN-HARRIS,

SYSTEMS DESIGN

BUILD-

720-74 (1997)

(describing PECO Energy's four-step dispute resolution clause as a systems design

model).
222. The mediation of disability-related workplace disputes is one example in
which particularized skills and training may be appropriate for mediators. See Judy
Cohen, ADA Guidelines Raise the Ethics Bar, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 3;
Peter R. Maida, Question of Competencies in ADA Mediations, DIsP. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 2004, at 9.
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review the merits of the mediated settlement agreement, and allow
for the time necessary to take that extra step to assure the substantive propriety of the settlement according to the worker's own idiosyncratic preferences. Professor Nancy Welsh has suggested a threeday cooling off period in the court-connected context, and such a cooling off period would also be appropriate in the context of the new
workplace, as it would foster both due process and dignitarian
223
interests.
c)

Ombuds

A third vehicle designers may wish to consider in promoting dispute resolution from a democratic perspective is that of the
ombudsman, or, as more recently termed, the ombuds. As a general
matter, an ombuds is an official, appointed by a public or private institution, who investigates complaints, facilitates their resolution
within that institution, and works for systemic changes to prevent
future disputes and other problems. Methods generally include investigating, publicizing, and recommending. While ombuds sometimes mediate and perform other dispute resolution functions as a
practical matter, the more classic model is to assist complainants, directing them to other processes that might be appropriate.
The office of the ombuds is of Scandinavian origin and has been
around for centuries, classically serving as a buffer between citizens
and their government. 22 4 Over the last quarter of a century, the office has been adapted to other environments, including the corporate
context.2 25 Because of their structure and purpose, ombuds have a
unique capacity to enhance personal autonomy with respect to individual decision making about workplace disputes. Organizationally,
ombuds are typically located outside of the management chain of
223. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 85-91 (2001).

224. See Walter Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1, 1-2
(1965); see generally THE OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK (Virgil Marti ed., 1994); WALTER
GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES
(1966); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE

PROCEDURES (1966).

225. See Howard Gadlin, An Ombudsman Serves as a Buffer Between and Among
Individuals and Large Institutions,4 DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 21, 22; see
generally Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3
NEGOT. J. 127, 127-39 (1987). For descriptions of other forms of ombuds, see American
Bar Association, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS OFFICES 1 (revised Feb. 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter ABA OMBUDS STANDARDS].

HeinOnline -- 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 55 2005

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 10:11

command, often reporting directly to the president or chief executive
officer of an organization. 2 26 This independence, and the confidentiality of the office, 2 27 contribute to the creation of a safe environment in
2 28
which workers may air their deepest concerns.
An ombuds serves a democracy-enhancing role in dispute resolution in a unique and powerful way: by providing an informal and
confidential means of empowering workers by helping them identify
their interests and concerns; by choosing dispute resolution alternatives that will best accommodate those interests and concerns; and by
providing some informal assistance in facilitating these personal
choices. Moreover, to the extent that an individual employee raises
issues that the ombuds discerns as problems that are systemic in nature - such as routinized sexual harassment within a particular department or unit - the ombuds has the authority to raise such issues
with senior management, regulators, or even the general public in a
way that can help alleviate the problem without identifying the
worker or workers who raised the issue. 2 29 In this way, the ombuds
not only contributes to personal autonomy with respect to the individual worker involved in a dispute, but also promotes the political values of participation and accountability for the entire organization, as
well as the legal values of equality and due process, which in turn can
foster such social capital values as social connection, reciprocity, ind
trust.

2 30

3.

The Darker Choice

All of these are ways of structuring inherently less democratic
dispute resolution processes into a dispute resolution program for the
new workplace in a way that preserves and promotes the underlying
democratic value of autonomy, as well as the other democratic values
that go to the heart of the new workplace. By contrast, depriving
employees of such choices through a system of institutionalized
226. See ABA OMBUDS STANDARDS, supra note 225, at A-C.
227. Id. at C(3).
228. Indeed, some have suggested that ombuds be used as a means of complying
with requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that companies provide a safe
vehicle for reporting violations of the Act. See, e.g., Sharan Levine & Paula Aylward,
Integrity Meets Integrity: Using Ombuds to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 11 Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2005, at 13.
229. See ABA OMBUDS STANDARDS, supra note 225, at A(7).
230. For a discussion of social capital, see supra notes 44-70 and accompanying
text.
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mandatory and binding arbitration, or democratically deficient mediation programs can, in my view, be expected to undermine the democratic values and structure of the new workplace. I explore these
implications in the next section, drawing especially on the organizational behavior literature for empirical scholarly support.
C.

The Consequences of Undemocratic Dispute Resolution
Processes: Eroding Social Capital

Just as the use of autonomy-enhancing dispute resolution
processes can be salutary in reinforcing the values and structure of
the new workplace, undemocratic dispute resolution processes can be
expected to have just the opposite effect: undermining the OCB and
trust that is so important to the social capital of the new workplace,
with predictable negative consequences for such traditional organizational measurements as performance, compliance, and retention.
1. Diminished Social Capital
a)

OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior

As we have seen, organizational citizenship behavior generally
refers to the willingness of employees to engage in constructive work1
place behaviors that are beyond their formal job descriptions. 23
There are many different motivators of OCB, including procedural
justice, participation in decision-making, and high-quality relation23 2
ships between and among supervisors and co-workers.
Procedural justice, one of the primary determinants of OCB in
the workplace, 23 3 is particularly undermined by mandatory and binding arbitration, but can also be affected by other undemocratic features of a dispute resolution method or system. As a conceptual
matter, procedural justice generally refers to worker perceptions of
the fairness of workplace procedures on matters such as promotions
231.
232.

See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., C. Ann Smith et al., OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior:Its Nature
and Antecedents, 68 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 653, 661 (1983) (job satisfaction as a proxy

for positive mood state positively correlated with higher OCB of altruism).
233. See, e.g., Nico W. VanYperen et al., Towards a Better Understandingof the
Link Between Participationin Decision-Making and OrganizationalCitizenship Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis, 72 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCH. 377, 377-79
(1999). Other determinants of OCB in the workplace include participation in decision-making, workers' felt sense of trustworthiness by supervisors, high quality relationships between workers and managers, and perceived organizational support. Id.
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and other rewards, as well as dispute resolution. 23 4 Perceptions of
procedural justice in the workplace have been found to be affected by
several process characteristics, such as the neutrality of the decisionmaker and decisional process, the degree of trust in the decisionmaking authority, and respect for status. 235 Significantly, these
characteristics are consistent with the characteristic perceptions of
procedural fairness in the resolution of conflict, 236 and resonate in
the democratic values of participation, transparency, equality, and
due process. To the extent that procedural justice expectations are
met, they serve to further the virtuous cycle of OCB. 2 3 7 However to

the extent that these expectations are not met, they have been found
to result in lower OCB, 2 38 and can contribute to vicious cycles of
employee behavior. 2 39 This in turn diminishes an organization's social capital.
As discussed more fully below, reactance theory would suggest
that workers may rebel with undesirable behaviors, and indeed, the
empirical research supports this view by indicating that workers who
believe they have been denied procedural justice may respond by in2 40
hibiting their task performance.
234. Procedural justice should be distinguished from distributive justice, which
refers to the perceptions of the fairness of the substantive outcomes of workplace decisional processes. See Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 292 (2003); Ellen S. Cohn et al., Distributiveand
Procedural Justice in Seven Nations, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 553-59 (2000).
235. For a general discussion, see Linda D. Molm et al., In the Eye of the Beholder:
Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 Am. Soc. REV. 128, 131-32 (2003).
236. See generally Welsh, supra note 189, at 817-26 (discussing opportunity for
voice, perception that views were considered, respectful treatment, impartiality of the
decision-maker and decisional process).
237. See, e.g., Bennett J. Tepper & Edward C. Taylor, RelationshipsAmong Supervisors' and Subordinates'ProceduralJustice Perceptionsand OrganizationalCitizenship Behaviors, 46 ACAD.

MGMT. J.

97 (2003) (finding relationship

between

subordinates' perceptions of procedural justice and willingness to engage in organizational citizenship behavior).
238. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. See also Bennet J. Tepper,
Health Consequencesof OrganizationalInjustice, 86 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISIONAL

PRoc. 197 (2001) (finding relationship between procedural justice and psychological
distress stronger when distributive justice is lower).
239. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. For analysis of the vicious
cycle of distrust, see Toshio Yamagishi, Trust as a Form of Social Intelligence, in
TRUST IN SOCIETY 121, 124-27 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001).
240. See Rousseau, supra note 21, at 128-29; Kickul & Lester, supra note 109;
William H. Turnley et al., The Impact of Psychological Contract Fulfillment on the
Performance of In-Role and OrganizationalCitizenship Behaviors, 29 J. MGMT. 187
(2003) (fulfillment of psychological contract positively correlated with in-role performance and organizational citizenship behavior directed at both company and fellow
employees).
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Employer-Employee Trust

Trust theory would also suggest that undemocratic features of a
workplace dispute resolution process might erode trust between the
241
employee and the company.
Trust has been studied in a wide array of academic disciplines.
It has been often seen as a function of expectations and vulnerability,
in particular the expectation that another will behave in a certain
way, especially in times of risk, ambiguity, or uncertainty. 2 42 Compliance with expectations at times of vulnerability generates more
trust, while departures or defections from those expectations lead to
distrust. 2 43 Interpersonally and organizationally, positive or constructive consequences generally flow from the achievement of trust.
Such consequences include cooperation, reciprocity (and its related
cycling benefits), greater efficiency and effectiveness in social relations, as well as a reservoir of good will that is capable of absorbing
occasional failed expectations without a total loss of trust. 24 4 Conversely, negative or destructive consequences flow from the breach of
trust and the rise of distrust, such as alienation, attribution error,
2 45
and self-serving behavior.
In the new workplace, trust is a particularly important part of
24 6
the psychological contract between the company and the employee
and a vital component of a company's social capital. 2 4 7 As noted
241. To be clear, I am not discussing the procedural justice question of whether
the employee feels the arbitration process itself is fair. That in my view is distinct
from the question of the impact of compelled participation on the employee's trust in
the employer. A mandatory and binding arbitration system that is by all accounts
standard-setting for actual and perceived fairness is still improper and potentially
destructive from a democratic theory perspective, where the emphasis is on the person, and less on the process. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 187, at 2681-85.
242. See, e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, supra note 148, at 135-39; S.D. Boon & J.G.
Holmes, The Dynamics of Interpersonal Trust: Resolving Uncertainty in the Face of
Risk, in COOPERATION AND PROsocIAL BEHAVIOR 120-211 (R.A. Hinde & J. Groebel
eds., 1991); J.B. Rotter, A New Scale for the Measurement of InterpersonalTrust, 35 J.
OF PERSONALITY 651, 651-55 (1967).
243. Lewicki & Bunker, supra note 148, at 161.
244. See Douglas Hofstadter, The Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Tournament
Games, in DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE EsSENCE OF THE MIND (1985) (describing characteristics of "tit for tat" game theory
strategy).
245. See generally Morton Deutsch, Cooperation and Competition, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21-41 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000); see also Yamagishi, supra note 239, at 121, 124-27
(analyzing vicious cycle of distrust).
246. See Stone, Psychological Contract, supra note 1, at 552-53.
247. See ESTLUND, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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above, the new workplace carries many expectations, including expectations with respect to the resolution of disputes. Most non-union
employees probably expect that workplace disputes can be worked
out through simple one-on-one or intermediated negotiations with coworkers, supervisors, or upper management. However, to the extent
that this is not possible and the disputes become formalized, employees may reasonably be assumed to expect to have the option of resolving those disputes in a court of law. 248 The "right" to one's "day in

court" is a socially learned expectation and a powerful cultural norm
in American democracy, 24 9 and there is little reason to believe that
workers generally would not have that expectation with respect to
employment disputes. To the contrary, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
expressly grants trial rights for workplace discrimination, 25 0 as do
other statutes.2 5 1 Less democratic processes such as mandatory and
binding arbitration not only frustrate this expectation, but do so in a
particularly shocking way. For example, a party may not even be
aware of a contractual arbitration provision until it is invoked to bar
2 52
access to the courts.
In breaching this expectation, mandatory and binding arbitration also breaches the psychological contract that the employee will
receive procedural justice in the hands of the company. Again, trust
theory is illuminative, suggesting that this clash between workplace
expectations and reality can be particularly jarring and disruptive.
Professor Roy Lewicki suggests that trust may in part be understood
to operate at various levels of intensity, roughly ranging from what
he calls "calculus-based trust" (based on an arm's length assessment
of what a person or entity would do in a situation of ambiguity) to
what he calls "identification-based trust" (based on shared values, beliefs, orientations, etc.). 253 While workplace trust can generally be
248. Empirical study of this assumption would be helpful.
249. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HAnv. L.
REV. 961, 1167 (2001) (citing, interalia, Ronald Dworkin, Principle,Policy, Procedure,
in A MArrER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part 1, 1973 DuKE L.J.
1153, 1177 ("however articulated, defended, or accounted for, the sense of legal rights
as claims whose realization has intrinsic value can fairly be called rampant in our
culture and traditions").
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1991).
251. See, e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (1990)
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
252. The Supreme Court has recognized as much. See First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940-41 (1995).
253. See Lewicki & Bunker, supra note 148, at 144-55.
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seen as having a calculative component, there may also be an identification-based component. This is especially true of new workplaces,
because of the high premium placed on social connection and the cultivation of social capital.
This social connection is helpful when trust expectations are met
- for instance, through dispute resolution policies and procedures
that are generally more consistent with autonomy and other democratic values. Meeting expectations reinforces and deepens existing
trust, fosters reciprocity, and inspires workplace morale and other
OCBs. However, when trust expectations are breached - such as
through a dispute resolution method that is inconsistent with democratic new workplace values - existing trust is destroyed and, over
time, can be displaced with distrust, alienation, enmity, and cynicism. 2 54 Moreover, when trust expectations are elevated to the identity level, the consequences of the breach of trust are felt most deeply
2 55
and may be irreparable.
2. PredictableEffects
What might be the effect of the loss of trust and the diminishment of OCB? Reactance theory suggests that employees will respond with workplace deviant behavior rather than just taking the
deprivation of dispute resolution rights in stride. Reactance theory
generally posits that people will become psychologically aroused
when their ability to perform "free behaviors" is threatened or limited. The greater the threat or limitation, the greater the arousal or
reaction will be. 2 56 The reactance arousal phenomenon has been
studied in a wide variety of contexts, such as patient non-compliance
with medical prescriptions, 25 7 teen drinking, 258 the ineffectiveness of
jury instructions, 25 9 and heightened sexual attractiveness of persons
254. See PRUIrr, supra note 70; see also Lynne M. Andersson & Thomas S. Bateman, Cynicism in the Workplace: Some Causes and Effects, 18 J. ORG. BEHAV. 449,
451-54 (1997) (discussing various fairness factors as predictors of cynicism in the
workplace).
255. See Lewicki & Bunker, supra note 148, at 165-67.
256. See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 4 (1966).
257. See, e.g., Jeanne S. Fogarty, Reactance Theory and PatientNoncompliance, 45
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1277, 1277-88 (1997).
258. See, e.g., Ruth C. Engs et al., The Drinking Patterns and Problems of a National Sample of College Students, 1994: Implications for Education, 41 J. OF ALCOHOL & DRUG ED. 13, 13-33 (1996).
259. See, e.g., Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of
Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failuresof Instructions to Disregard PretrialPublicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y. & L. 677, 695-97 (2000).
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with whom sexual relationships are not available. 260 While the question begs empirical study, reactance theory suggests that the limitations on the freedom of workers to choose to go to court (or mediation,
or some other form of dispute resolution, for that matter) created by
unilaterally imposed arbitration requirements may be expected to
lead to workplace deviant behaviors that would diminish social capital. The organizational behavior literature strongly suggests that
this weakening of social capital can be expected to have deleterious
effects on such standard measures of effectiveness as performance,
recruitment and retention, and compliance with company policies,
decisions, and objectives.
a) Performance
Performance may be seen as a function of employee workplace
behaviors "that are under the control of the individual [employee]
and contribute to the goals of the organization." 26 1 Organizational
behavior researchers have identified three major categories of behaviors as constituting performance: task performance, organizational
citizenship behavior, and workplace deviant behaviors. 2 62 Task performance is what we commonly think of as performance, referring
generally to worker output, but both OCB and workplace deviant behaviors also have been found to be important components of performance in the sense of the employee's overall contribution to the
company. 2 63 For example, in a study of three specific OCBs - helping, sportsmanship, and civic virtue - in the performance of small
workgroups of paper mill workers, researchers found that both
sportsmanship and helping behaviors were positively predictive of
task performance, measured in terms of the quantity and quality of
paper produced by the groups. 26 4 A similar study found positive relationships between the organizational citizenship behaviors of sportsmanship and civic virtue in the overall performance of insurance
260. See James W. Pennebaker et al., Don't the Girls Get PrettierAt Closing Time:
A Country and Western Application to Psychology, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 122, 122-25 (1979).
261. Maria Rotundo & Paul R. Sackett, The Relative Importance of Task, Citizenship, and Counterproductive Performance to Global Ratings of Job Performance:A
Policy-CapturingApproach, 87 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 66, 66 (2002).
262. Id. at 67-69.
263. See Stephan J. Motowidlo & James R. Van Scotter, Evidence that Task Performance Should Be DistinguishedFrom Contextual Performance, 79 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 475, 475-80 (1994).
264. Philip M. Podsakoff et al., Organizational Citizenship Behavior and the
Quantity and Quality of Work Group Performance, 82 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 262,
262-70 (1997).
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agents. 265 Such studies support the intuitive proposition that there
is a positive correlation between trust and OCB, and between OCB
and task performance, although they do leave much nuance to be
parsed through further empirical research. Measures that enhance
workplace trust enhance OCB, and can be expected to have a positive
effect on task performance. Similarly, workplace measures that diminish trust, such as a less democratic dispute resolution method or
process, can be expected to diminish OCB, and in turn, task
2 66
performance.
b)

Compliance with OrganizationalRules, Policies, and
Practices

Another significant casualty of the diminishment of social capital
that can flow from the implementation of a mandatory and binding
arbitration or other less democratic processes is the diminishment of
compliance with, and promotion of, organizational rules, policies, and
practices. This willingness to comply with rules and policies voluntarily is crucial in the workplace environment, 26 7 in part because of the
high transactional and opportunity costs that can be associated with
the lack of compliance. 268 Indeed, a central tenet of the new workplace is that people will work hard because they want the company to
succeed, not because they are coerced to work.
Reactance theory alone would suggest that the workers who have
been stripped of their court rights might tend to be less compliant
with company rules, policies, and goals. Indeed, using the example of
a secretary who has been told she can't chew gum on the job, Brehm
says reactance theory would predict that "[sihe can re-establish her
265. Philip M. Potsakoff & Scott B. MacKenzie, Organizational Behavior and
Sales Unit Effectiveness, 31 J. OF MARKETING RESEARCH 351, 351-63 (1994). Interestingly, these researchers did not find a correlation between the OCB of helping behaviors and overall performance.
266. See Lester & Brower, supra note 146.
267. As Tom Tyler writes, "A judge's ruling means little if the parties to the dispute feel they can ignore it. Similarly, passing a law prohibiting some behavior is not
useful if it does not affect how often the behavior occurs." TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAw 19 (1990).
268. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 207-09 (1968) (arguing that a rational actor will only be deterred
from committing a profitable wrong if the actor concludes in advance that the expected gain from the wrong is greater than the product of the amount of the potential
sanction and the probability that the sanction will be imposed); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damagesand the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 424-25 (1998)
(recognizing same); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 887-88 (1998).
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freedom by engaging in other behaviors of the same class, e.g., sucking on candy or smoking, or better yet, she can engage in what she
would assume to be even less acceptable behaviors such as putting on
lipstick, combing her hair, or eating candy bars." 26 9
Such an understanding would be reinforced by trust theory. As
an empirical matter, the relationship between trust and rule-compliance has been studied extensively in the context of citizen compliance
with legal rules.2 70 A leading researcher, New York University social
psychologist Tom R. Tyler, has consistently found that trust in legal
institutions far exceeds other factors - including agreement in the
substantive correctness of the law - as the primary determinant of
the willingness to comply with legal rules.2 7 1 More specifically,
Tyler's research suggests people are most willing to comply with the
law when it is perceived to be legitimate in the sense that it is perceived to be entitled to, or deserving of, compliance. 2 72 Tyler has further found that the primary determinants of this sense of legitimacy
or entitlement are the procedural fairness of the decision-making process and an underlying trust in the motives of legal authorities. 2 73
Tyler's research suggests that people begin with a trusting posture,
or "illusion of benevolence" toward legal institutions, and then test
that trust with each interaction with the institution. 2 74 Here the research is striking, showing that it is the integrity of the process by
which the rule is developed and applied - the processes and behaviors
of legal authorities - that determines whether these initially trusting
expectations are met or defeated.2 7 5 What is equally striking is that
the reference points most salient in making the determination of procedural integrity are the very factors identified in Part III as being
269. See BREHM, supra note 256, at 11. While Brehm was obviously writing in a
different era for the status of women, the example is still helpful.
270. The most significant of this research focused on citizen contact with police
and courts as a proxy for what I describe here as the rule of law. See Tyler, Public
Mistrust, supra note 115, at 856-58. For a discussion of earlier interdisciplinary research on the relationship between compliance and law, see Jerry N. Clark et al.,
Compliance, Obedience, and Revolt in SAMUEL KRISLOV ET AL., COMPLIANCE AND THE
LAw 9 (1972)
271. See Tyler, Public Mistrust, supra note 115, at 867.
272. Both morality and legitimacy of law strongly outweighed other more instrumental factors affecting compliance, such as the probability of getting caught. See id.
at 859-60.
273. Id. at 866.
274. See Tyler, Public Mistrust, supra note 115, at 868-69.
275. This result is consistent with the wealth of research on procedural justice
that has arisen out of the larger dispute resolution movement. For a good overview,
see Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Proceduraland Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004).
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central to both democratic legitimacy and the new workplace:
whether the authorities (the company, in our context) allow people to
influence the outcome (participation), allow people to speak and present evidence (participation), behave neutrally (equality and due process), treat people with dignity and respect (due process), explain
judgments (transparency and rationality), and provide desired outcomes (rationality).2 7 6 The consistency of these values across different contexts bears testament to the depth to which they are
entrenched in the American psyche.
Again, more empirical research is needed, but the implications
for the new workplace seem intuitive enough: the more the workplace operates in a manner that is consistent with our expectations
along these dimensions - including with respect to dispute resolution
- the more legitimacy the workplace as an institution may be expected to command, the more likely employees will be to comply voluntarily with its rules, policies and goals, and the more OCB will be
encouraged. Conversely, the less the workplace acts in accordance
with our expectations along these dimensions, the less likely employees will be to comply voluntarily with its commands, thereby reducing the overall effectiveness of the organization.
c)

Recruitment and Retention

Recruitment and retention are important management functions, 2 77 and the fluid structure and values of the new workplace
raise the stakes for management to "attract people, hold people, and
serve and satisfy people." 2 78 The competition for talent is particu2 79
larly fierce, as demand is clearly expected to outpace the supply.

Where the old workplace relied on salary and tenure to achieve these
ends, the contingent nature of the new workplace commands "job satisfaction," "job quality," and "workplace support" - that is, reasons to
come to a company, and reasons to stay. Recruiting is a vital component, and more progressive new workplace companies will emphasize
276.

See Tyler, Public Mistrust, supra note 115, at 869-73.

See, e.g., THOMAS S. BATEMAN & SCOTT A. SNELL, MANAGEMENT: THE NEW
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE, 298-320 (6th ed. 2004) (focusing on needs and challenges of
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human resources management).
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Drucker, The New Society of Organizations,supra note 1, at 95, 100.

279. For example, in assessing the massive knowledge industry, McKinsey &
Company has concluded that "the most important global resource over the next 20
years will be talent: smart, sophisticated business people who are technologically literate, globally astute, and operationally agile." Gregory D. Dess & Jason D. Shaw,
Voluntary Turnover, Social Capital, and OrganizationalPerformance, 26 AcAD. OF
MGMT. REV. 446, 447 (quoting C. Fishman, The War for Talent, 16 FAST COMPANY 104,
105 (1998)).
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the prospective employee's mindsets, attitudes, general knowledge,
experience, and social skills, rather than recruiting on the basis of a
precise fit between the skills of the candidate and the tasks to be performed. 28 0 As one human resources expert puts it, new workplaces
will "hire for attitude and train for skill." 28 1 Such a philosophy recognizes the natural inclination of employees to want to grow professionally through new skills training and opportunities, as well as the
need for flexibility that more dynamic working environments require.
Once suitable workers have been recruited, new workplace managers will strive to create an environment in which they are generally
2 2
satisfied - not only because they will be more productive workers,
but because it will make them more likely to stay. Voluntary turnover carries high costs, in terms of departure costs (e.g., administrative processing time, taking of final sick or personal days, etc.),
replacement costs (e.g., advertising, interviewing, etc.), training and
development, and other costs (e.g., lost opportunities, damaged morale, etc.). 28

3

By contrast, retention of desirable workers contributes

to stability in the workplace, greater human and social capital, and,
28 4
potentially, higher productivity.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a now-classic work on choosing dispute resolution processes,
Professors Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg argued that
the "forum [should] fit the fuss." 28 5 In this article, I have extended

this thinking in the design context, suggesting that the forum should
also fit the environment. While variants of this principle have already played an important part in the development of public policy

280. Id. at 35.
281. Id. at 36.
282. The research on the relationship between worker satisfaction and productivity generally does not support this proposition, and is at best mixed. See DAVID MACAROV, WORKER PRODUCTIVITY: MYTHS AND REALITY 113-115 (1982). For an attempt
to explain the perception that there is a correlation between satisfaction and performance, see Cynthia D. Fisher, Why Do Lay People Believe that Satisfaction and Performance are Correlated? Possible Sources of a Commonsense Theory, 24 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 753 (2003).
SMITH, supra note 32, at 21-22.
284. See id. at 20-33.
285. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 50 (1994).

283.
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dispute resolution, 28 6 here I apply it specifically to organizational culture, and argue that environmental fitness should be considered in
the workplace context. Dispute resolution systems designers have
many choices to make, such as the type or types of dispute resolution
methods to offer within those systems, the manner in which participants become involved in those processes, and the method through
which those programs are evaluated for success. 28 7 We should add to
these considerations the question of how the dispute resolution system will affect workplace culture, efficiency, and effectiveness. Important consideration should be given to the degree to which
organizational goals include cultivating a new workplace, as I have
described in this article. If that is a goal, organizational dispute resolution designers should recognize that the characteristics of the new
workplace are, at their root, consistent with the fundamental political
participation, legal, and social capital values that have been found to
determine the quality of democratic governance in the sphere of public governance. This understanding should be used to help cultivate
approaches to dispute resolution that are consistent with the democratic character of the new workplace.
Plainly some dispute resolution methods have a stronger inherent democratic character than others. Consensual processes like mediation can be seen as being less problematic from a democratic
perspective because they generally involve both the worker and the
employer as decision makers. Adjudicatory processes like arbitration
differ in that the dispute is resolved not by the parties but by a third
party, and thus can raise additional problems from a democratic perspective. Among adjudicatory processes, public adjudication through
the traditional process of public trial and appeal has a generally high
democratic character, while private adjudication through arbitration
has a mixed or contingent democratic character, which depends upon
the degree of autonomy the parties have with respect to the process.
As a process, private arbitration has a generally lower democratic
character because it frustrates rather than fosters such values as accountability, rationality, and equality. However, waiving these values is a plausible choice, sometimes even a wise choice, that
participants in a dispute may make in order to gain the process virtues of expertise, informality, speed, and finality that arbitration has
286.
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to offer. Expanding the sphere of dispute resolution options strongly
promotes the fundamental principle of autonomy that lies at the
heart of corporate democracy in the workplace, just as it does in the
governmental context.
The democratization of the new workplace is about its enlightenment, and represents a natural evolution from the earliest thinking
about the fitness of democracy as a vehicle for collective self-governance, beginning in the Age of Enlightenment and continuing through
the grand experiment of American political democracy. As we have
seen since then, democratic principles have great power to support a
vibrant society, capable of sustaining both individual and collective
maximization. Today's workers, managers, shareholders, and consumers of the new workplace deserve no less.
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